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FEIGNED CONSENSUS:
USURPING THE LAW IN SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME/
ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA PROSECUTIONS
KEITH A. FINDLEY,* D. MICHAEL RISINGER,** PATRICK D.
BARNES,*** JULIE A. MACK,**** DAVID A. MORAN,***** BARRY C.
SCHECK,******
AND THOMAS L. BOHAN*******
Few medico-legal matters have generated as much controversy—both
in the medical literature and in the courtroom—as Shaken Baby Syndrome
(SBS), now known more broadly as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT). The
controversies are of enormous significance in the law because child abuse
pediatricians claim, on the basis of a few non-specific medical findings
supported by a weak and methodologically flawed research base, to be able
to “diagnose” child abuse, and thereby to provide all of the evidence
necessary to satisfy all of the legal elements for criminal prosecution (or
removal of children from their parents). It is a matter, therefore, in which
medical opinion claims to fully occupy the legal field. As controversies
flare up increasingly in the legal arena, child abuse pediatricians and
prosecutors now respond by claiming both that there is actually no real
controversy about SBS/AHT, and that it is a purely medical “diagnosis”
and not a legal conclusion, so testimony in support of the SBS hypothesis
should not be challenged in court. This article, coauthored by four law
professors, two physicians, and a physicist, demonstrates that there is very
much a live controversy about the SBS/AHT hypothesis and maintains that,
under traditional principles of evidence law, physicians should not be
permitted to “diagnose” abuse in court (as opposed to identifying specific
symptoms or medical findings).
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INTRODUCTION
Few medico-legal matters have generated as much controversy—
both in the medical literature and in the courtroom—as Shaken Baby
Syndrome (SBS), now known more broadly, at the urging of the
American Academy of Pediatrics, as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT).1
The medical and legal literature is replete with research and opinion
pieces debating all aspects of the hypothesis;2 entire sessions at medical
and legal conferences are devoted to examining the disputed issues and

1.
Cindy W. Christian, Robert Block, & the Committee on Child Abuse and
Neglect, Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1410
(2009) (“[T]he American Academy of Pediatrics recommends adoption of the term
‘abusive head trauma’ as the diagnosis used in the medical chart to describe the
constellation of cerebral, spinal, and cranial injuries that result from inflicted head
injury to infants and young children.”).
2.
See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
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strategizing ways to defeat the other side in these debates;3 and growing
numbers of courts are recognizing the controversies and overturning
convictions on the basis of the expanding uncertainties related to
medical opinion purporting to diagnose abuse.4
3.
See, e.g., Keith A. Findley et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head
Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209,
241 (2012) (observing that the National Association of Medical Examiners conference
in 2006 “included presentations entitled ‘Use of the Triad of Scant Subdural
Hemorrhage, Brain Swelling, and Retinal Hemorrhages to Diagnose Non-Accidental
Injury is Not Scientifically Valid’ and ‘“Where’s the Shaking?”’ Dragons, Elves, the
Shaking Baby Syndrome and Other Mythical Entities.’”); Robert M. Reece et al., The
Evidence Base for Shaken Baby Syndrome: Response to Editorial from 106 Doctors,
328 BRIT. MED. J. 1316, 1316–17 (2004); Brian Holmgren, Assistant District Attorney
General, Keynote Address at Eleventh International Conference on Shaken Baby
Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma: To Tell the Truth – Examining Defense Witness
Testimony
in
Abusive
Head
Trauma
Cases
(Sept.
13,
2010),
https://www.dontshake.org/media/k2/attachments/2010-AtlantaProgram.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YDQ7-96CC] (presentation notes and lyrics on file with authors).
4.
See, e.g., People v. Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858 (Mich. 2015) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present medical evidence disputing the
prosecution experts’ SBS/AHT-based opinions); People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713, 724
(N.Y.S. Cnty. Ct. 2014) (finding newly discovered evidence of emerging medical research
challenging the SBS/AHT diagnosis); People v. Baumer, No. 267373, 2007 WL 1095236,
at *1, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2007) (discussing ineffective assistance of
counsel), motion for immediate consideration granted, 781 N.W.2d 309 (Mich. 2010); Ex
Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel); Armando Castillo: Actual Innocence – Invalid Science –
Conviction Vacated, AZ JUST. PROJECT (May 21, 2015), https://
www.azjusticeproject.org/manifest-injustice-profiles/armando-castillo
[https://perma.cc/9VH9-HYH9] (discussing the judge’s conclusion of ineffective
assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence); Brafford v. State, No. PC-2014-803
(Okla. Crim. App. March 26, 2019) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel and newly
discovered evidence warranted new trial); Brown v. State, 152 So.3d 1146, 1169 (Miss. 2014)
(concluding that the trial court erroneously denied funds for defense to hire experts to
challenge state’s expert medical evidence); People v. Dimambro, 897 N.W.2d 233 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2016); Barry Siegel, Judging Parents as Murderers on 4 Specks
of
Blood,
L.A.
TIMES
(July
11,
1999),
http://
articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/11/news/mn-54984 [https://perma.cc/5WCV-J9LK] (discussing
newly discovered evidence); Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 N.E.3d 1247, 1266 (Mass.
2016) (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence); In re
Pers. Restraint of Fero, 367 P.3d 588, 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing newly
discovered medical evidence), rev’d, 409 P.3d 214, 226 (Wash. 2018); State v. Hales,
152 P.3d 321, 325 (Utah 2007) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel); Ex Parte
Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting the effect of newly
discovered medical evidence); Order on Defendant’s Motion to Disallow the Introduction
of Testimony Regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome, State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-CR00016-02
(Cir. Ct. Shelby Cty. Nov. 2007) (discussing newly discovered medical evidence); Isham
v. State, 161 So.3d 1076, 1077 (Miss. 2015) (holding that the defendant was entitled
to a publicly funded expert to refute the prosecution's SBS/AHT scientific evidence);
Maurice Possley, Joel Lehmer, NAT’L REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS
(July
29,
2012),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3953
[https://perma.cc/8FE4-DQT9] (concluding that newly discovered medical evidence
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Increasingly, proponents of the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” have
attempted to take the debate away from the courts through efforts to
delegitimize those who criticize or challenge some aspects of the
SBS/AHT hypothesis. Instead of encouraging full airing of scientific
debate—a hallmark of true scientific inquiry—SBS/AHT-hypothesis
proponents have sought to silence debate and dissent by demeaning
physicians who break ranks,5 attempting to strip the critics of their
medical licenses and society memberships6 or jobs,7 attempting to bar

warranted vacating the convictions); Joseph Shapiro, Free, but Not Cleared: Ernie
NPR
(Mar.
5,
2012,
4:06
PM),
Lopez
Comes
Home,
https://www.npr.org/2012/03/05/147969316/free-but-not-cleared-ernie-lopez-comeshome [https://perma.cc/NM2H-SBWY] (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel
and newly discovered medical evidence); Kenneth Marsh, CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/kenneth-marsh/
[https://perma.cc/754S-6HAL] (discussing the dismissal of charges in light of newly
discovered evidence); Commonwealth v. Millien, 50 N.E.3d 808, 809 (Mass. 2016)
(concluding ineffective assistance of counsel); Alexandra Gross, John Peel, NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3813
[https://perma.cc/VSV8-3XX3] (reversing defendant’s convictions in light of newly
discovered evidence); State v. Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1108 (N.M. 2008)
(reversing defendant’s convictions on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel);
State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 250 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the lower court did
not unreasonably conclude that newly discovered evidence probably would change the
result at trial). Still other courts have also granted relief under the more difficult
standards requiring a petitioner to establish actual innocence. See, e.g., Del Prete v.
Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that medical evidence
challenging the state’s SBS/AHT-based opinions established the petitioner’s “actual
innocence” sufficiently to permit her to proceed on otherwise defaulted claims); Robins
v. State, 385 P.3d 57 (Nev. 2016) (holding that, in part, new medical evidence
established defendant’s actual innocence claim, permitting defendant to proceed on
otherwise defaulted claims).
5.
See Findley et al., supra note 3, at 226–27 and notes 54–55 (describing
how Dr. Christopher Greeley, Assoc. Professor of Pediatrics, Univ. of Tex. Health
Sci. Ctr. at Houston, while presenting at New York City Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken
Baby Syndrome Training Conference in 2011, suggested that researchers who question
SBS/AHT theory use “sleaze tactics” and may have “histrionic/borderline” personality
disorders; also noting that high-profile SBS/AHT prosecutor Brian Holmgren, who
presented the Keynote Address at the Eleventh International Conference on Shaken
Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma: To Tell the Truth—Examining Defense
Witness Testimony in Abusive Head Trauma Cases, showed excerpts of testimony from
defense experts juxtaposed with an image of Pinocchio with a growing nose, concluding
with a sing-along to the tune of “If I only had a brain” led by a prominent child abuse
pediatrician, joined by prosecutors and doctors, mocking those who propose diagnostic
alternatives to SBS/AHT).
6. See, e.g., Peter J. Strouse, Child Abuse: We Have Problems, 46
PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 587, 588 (2016) (disparaging SBS/AHT “denialists” as
“deceitful and unethical” and arguing that “[l]icensing bureaus could have a role by
limiting practice” and that professional societies “should question condoning the
activities of denialists by allowing them to continue membership and to continue to use
society membership as evidence of expertise”).
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them from the courtroom,8 and even prosecuting them criminally for
their expert testimony on behalf of criminal defendants.9
Recently, these efforts have taken the form of denying that there is
any debate at all about the reliability of SBS and AHT determinations.
A recent very pointed example of that strategy, published as a so-called
“consensus” statement by the Society for Pediatric Radiology (SPR),10
prompts us, as legal, medical, and science scholars, to respond.
While the particular article that motivates this response was
published in a medical journal—Pediatric Radiology—we respond in a
law journal because the SPR statement was written primarily for a legal
audience—specifically, to influence judges in the way they handle
conflicting expert opinions in SBS/AHT cases and to equip prosecutors
to overcome defense challenges. Indeed, the statement directly
addresses the legal system, with major section headings such as, “[t]he
issues that perpetuate misconceptions in the courtroom,”11 and, “[w]hat
can be done to provide the court accurate information about the state of
medical knowledge in AHT,”12 along with subheadings such as, “[t]he
admissibility of expert evidence,”13 and the like. And the text speaks
directly to the courts, asserting, for example, that “[c]ourts should
assume that a consensus statement reflects general physician acceptance
of a particular precept,”14 and that, “[e]xperts, through consensus
7.
See id. (“Institutions that harbor denialists, whether they be private
practices or esteemed academic institutions, should carefully consider their
employment.”).
8.
See, e.g., Doctor Wins Appeal Over Shaken Baby Syndrome Trials
Evidence,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
4,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/nov/04/doctor-waney-squier-wins-appealshaken-baby-syndrome-trials-evidence [https://perma.cc/WG5W-7VVZ] (describing
efforts to revoke Dr. Waney Squier’s medical license and ban her from testifying in
child abuse cases); Mark Hansen, Battle of the Expert, A.B.A.J. (Dec. 29, 2005, 11:29
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battle_of_the_expert
[https://perma.cc/4CU3-9EG6] (describing a complaint filed with the Minnesota Board
of Medical Practice in 1999 against Dr. John Plunkett after he testified on behalf of a
baby sitter who was subsequently acquitted on charges of violently shaking a fourteenmonth-old boy; the complaint against Plunkett was ultimately dismissed).
9.
See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 8 (describing perjury charges brought
against Dr. John Plunkett in Oregon for his testimony in an SBS case—charges on
which he was acquitted after a trial); Radley Balko, Dr. John Plunkett, RIP. He Told
the Truth About Bad Forensics—and was Prosecuted for It, WASH. POST (Apr. 10,
2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2018/04/10/drjohn-plunkett-rip-he-told-the-truth-about-bad-forensics-and-was-prosecuted-forit/?utm_term=.99c825a28f81 (same).
10.
Arabinda Kumar Choudhary et al., Consensus Statement on Abusive Head
Trauma in Infants and Young Children, 48 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1048 (2018).
11.
Id. at 1057.
12.
Id. at 1058.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
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statements, can also help courts identify the medical evidence that
reflects scientific knowledge because it is supported by the evidence
and has been generally accepted in the relevant field of pediatric
medicine.”15 This, the SPR asserts, will “assist courts in identifying
testimonial parameters for expert testimony and help judges and juries
delineate evidence-based medical knowledge from fringe, speculative,
or professionally irresponsible opinions.”16 To sum it up, the statement
concludes that “[t]he professional societies’ consensus statement on
AHT should help the court recognize unsubstantiated medical expert
testimony.”17
Our response focuses on three points. First, we address the SPR’s
contention that there is in fact no dispute about SBS/AHT, and
therefore no reason for courts and juries to be distracted by dissenting
expert opinions. Second, we address the SPR’s claim that SBS/AHT is
purely a “medical diagnosis” and not at all a legal conclusion. Third,
we address the clear implication in the SPR statement that, given the
“general acceptance” purportedly represented by the consensus
statement and the absolute absence of any real debate, the courts should
defer entirely to the SPR and like-minded physicians’ groups rather
than making independent judicial inquiry into the reliability of proffered
expert testimony. Under this last point, we address two implicit subpoints from the SPR statement: (1) that courts should accordingly admit
prosecution-proffered testimony, but not defense-proffered contrary
testimony, about SBS/AHT; and (2) that courts should stop drawing the
legal conclusion that emerging controversies and shifts in medical
understandings about SBS/AHT provide a basis for granting
postconviction relief in cases where convictions were obtained without
benefit of the now-growing body of contradictory medical and
biomechanical science.
I. IS SBS/AHT CONTROVERSIAL?
In the debates about the reliability of the “diagnosis” of SBS/AHT,
the recent tack by child abuse pediatricians is to deny that the debate
exists—to deny there is any controversy at all.18 That approach is

15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 1060.
18.
Alternatively, child abuse pediatricians recognize the controversy but
argue that it should be ignored because it can impede their ability to diagnose abuse. As
Dr. Robert Block wrote in 1999: “Although controversy may spark scientific inquiry, it
can interfere with proper recognition and management. When one cares for children
who have been shaken, with or without impact, the controversy has no place in the
diagnosis of abuse, which has obviously occurred in either case.” Robert W. Block,
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apparent in the new SPR statement. The statement asserts, for example,
that “[t]here is no controversy concerning the medical validity of the
existence of AHT, with multiple components including subdural
hematoma, intracranial and spinal changes, complex retinal
hemorrhages, and rib and other fractures that are inconsistent with the
provided mechanism of trauma.”19 Later, the statement goes a step
further, asserting, “AHT is a scientifically non-controversial medical
diagnosis broadly recognized and managed throughout the world.”20
According to the SPR, the purported controversy reflects merely false
doubt generated by criminal defense attorneys and their unethical
experts: “Efforts to create doubt about AHT include the deliberate
mischaracterization and replacement of the complex and multifaceted
diagnostic process by a near-mechanical determination based on the
‘triad’—the findings of subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage and
encephalopathy.”21
A. Controversy in the Medical Literature
This claim of non-controversy, however, stands in stark contrast to
even a casual review of the literature, both medical and legal. Contrast,
for example, the SPR’s claim of no controversy to the following
excerpt from the most recent official position paper of the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) (one of the most adamant proponents of
the SBS/AHT hypothesis), published in 2009:
Few pediatric diagnoses engender as much debate as AHT, in
part because of the social and legal consequences of the
diagnosis. The diagnosis can result in children being removed
from their homes, parents losing their parental rights, and
adults being imprisoned for their actions. Controversy is
fueled because the mechanisms and resultant injuries of
accidental and abusive head injury overlap, the abuse is rarely
witnessed, an accurate history of trauma is rarely offered by
the perpetrator, there is no single or simple test to determine
the accuracy of the diagnosis, and the legal consequences of
the diagnosis can be so significant.22

Child Abuse—Controversies and Imposters, 29 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRICS 253, 255
(1999).
19.
Choudhary, supra note 10, at 1048.
20.
Id. at 1049.
21.
Id. at 1050.
22.
Christian, supra note 1, at 1410. Note the assumed conclusion that it is
the “perpetrator” who is giving the “history.”
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Likewise, when the National Association of Medical Examiners
initially adopted a position paper endorsing the SBS hypothesis in
2001—a paper it declined to renew when it expired five years later—the
editor of the American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology,
which published the position paper, added a note to the published
version of the paper explaining: “The manuscript was reviewed by
three reviewers on the Board of Editors of the American Journal of
Forensic Medicine and Pathology. They believed that while it was
worthy of publication, it should not be published as a position paper
because of the controversial nature of the subject.”23
The medical literature is replete with similar acknowledgements of
the controversy. Many such statements are found in writings by SBS
critics, as one would expect.24 But many acknowledgements are also
found in articles by physicians who accept the basic premise of the
hypothesis,25 and even by physicians who are the most vocal proponents
23.
Mary E. Case et al., National Association of Medical Examiners, Ad Hoc
Comm. on Shaken Baby Syndrome, Position Paper on Fatal Abusive Head Injuries in
Infants and Young Children, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 112, 112 (2001).
The editor also noted: “The Board of Directors responded to this opinion by stating that
position papers always deal with controversial subjects.” Id.
24. See, e.g., Randy Papetti et al., Outside the Echo Chamber: A Response to
the “Consensus Statement on Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children,” 59
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 366 (2019) (“[SBS/AHT] is not merely controversial, but
is perhaps the most controversial area in forensic medicine.”); RANDY PAPETTI, THE
FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 7 (Christopher Milroy ed.
2018) (“[T]oday such basic issues as what the ‘syndrome’ is and on what bases it is
diagnosed are themselves hotly debated issues.”); Jacob Andersson & Ingemar Thiblin,
National Study Shows that Abusive Head Trauma Mortality in Sweden was at Least 10
Times Lower than in Other Western Countries, 107 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 477, 477 (2018)
(“The validity of the diagnostic criteria for abusive head trauma (AHT) and its
attributes has been widely debated.”); Gören Höbgerb et al., Circularity Bias in
Abusive Head Trauma Studies Could be Diminished with a New Ranking Scale, 6
EGYPTIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 6, 7 (2016) (“This hypothesis has been subjected to debate
because the causal connection between exposure and clinical findings has never been
established.”); Steven C. Gabaeff, Exploring the Controversy in Child Abuse Pediatrics
and False Accusations, 18 LEGAL MED. 90 (2016); JAN E. LEESTMA, FORENSIC
NEUROPATHOLOGY 642 (3d ed. 2014); Patrick D. Barnes, Ethical Issues in Imaging
Nonaccidental Injury: Child Abuse, 13 TOPICS IN MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 85,
85 (2002) (“One of the most controversial areas of nonaccidental injury is the medical
diagnosis of inflicted central nervous system injury and its impact on medical, social,
and legal outcomes for children and families.”).
25. See, e.g., Beth A. Costine-Bartell et al., Development of a Model of
Hemispheric Hypodensity (“Big Black Brain”), 36 J. NEUROTRAUMA 815, 816 (2019)
(“[T]he exact etiological mechanisms that cause injury in children with AHT remain
controversial . . . .”); Christopher J. Hobbs & Robert A.C. Bilo, Nonaccidental
Trauma: Clinical Aspects and Epidemiology of Child Abuse, 39 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY
457, 459 (2009) (referencing the “medial controversy” about “abuse in infants with
head injury”); Paula Gerber & Kathryn Coffman, Nonaccidental Head Trauma in
Infants, 23 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 499, 505 (2007) (“Nonaccidental head trauma in
infants is the leading cause of infant death from injury. The high rate of repeated abuse
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of the SBS/AHT hypothesis.26 After the National Institutes of Health
convened a conference in 2002 to consider the issues in SBS cases, the
conference chair added a preface to the conference proceedings
observing: “Because there is very little scientific experimental or
descriptive work [on SBS], the pathophysiology remains obscure, and
the relationship to mechanics even cloudier . . . . What we need is
science—research and evidence that just isn’t there right now.”27
Among the physicians recognizing the controversy is Dr. Norman
Guthkelch, who forty years after first propounding the hypothesis
observed that the “problem of potential child abuse . . . has caused a
great deal of controversy since it was first described.”28 Indeed, Dr.
Guthkelch added, “While controversy is a normal and necessary part of

makes identification of potential cases crucial. The underlying biomechanics of injury
in this syndrome and the purported sequelae of accidental and nonaccidental trauma
remain controversial.”); D.M.B. Hall, The Future of Child Protection, 99 J. ROYAL
SOC’Y OF MED. 6, 7 (2006) (“[A]reas of controversy include the diagnosis of child
sexual abuse, the problem of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ and the extent to which
abnormally fragile bones might account for unexplained fractures.”); Scott Denton &
Darinka Mileusnic, Delayed Sudden Death in an Infant Following an Accidental Fall: A
Case Report with a Review of the Literature, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY
371, 371 (2003) (“Several controversies exist regarding ultimately lethal head injuries in
small children. Death from short falls, timing of head injury, lucid intervals, presence
of diffuse axonal injury (DAI), and subdural hematoma (SDH) as a marker of DAI are
the most recent controversial topics of debate in this evolving field of study.”).
See, e.g., Carole A. Jenny et al., Biomechanical Response of the Infant
26.
Head to Shaking: An Experimental Investigation, 34 J. NEUROTRAUMA 1, 1 (2017)
(“Controversy exists regarding whether violent shaking is harmful to infants in the
absence of impact.”); Matthieu Vinchon, Reply to Pr Charles Hyman: The Scientific
Controversy Over Abusive Head Trauma in Infants, 27 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 203, 203
(2011) (“We are well aware of the controversial nature of the series of papers . . .
published by our team in Child’s Nervous System on the topic of infantile head injuries .
. . .”); Christopher S. Greeley, A Witnessed Short Fall Mimicking Presumed Shaken
Baby Syndrome (Inflicted Childhood Neurotrauma), 44 PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY 90,
90 (2008) (“It is refreshing to see controversial topics addressed in the medical
literature in such a balanced fashion. This will hopefully result in furthering our
understanding of some of the controversies in inflicted brain injury and fewer
unsupported opinions in legal proceedings.”); Kent P. Hymel, Carole Jenny, & Robert
W. Block, Intracranial Hemorrhage and Rebleeding in Suspected Victims of Abusive
Head Trauma: Addressing the Forensic Controversies, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 329
(2002); Mark S. Dias, Inflicted Head Injury: Future Directions and Prevention, 13
NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 247, 247 (2002) (“Despite the explosion of interest
and the clarification of certain features, many unanswered questions remain [about
AHT]. Some of the answers to these questions are difficult or even impossible to
obtain, because the medical facts are, by nature, uncertain or unreliable in many
cases.”).
27.
Carole E. Nicholson, Preface to INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA,
at ix (Robert M. Reece & Carol E. Nicholson eds., 2003) (publishing the conference
proceedings).
28.
A.N. Guthkelch, Problems of Infant Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with
Minimal External Injury, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 201 (2012).
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scientific discourse, there has arisen a level of emotion and divisiveness
on shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma that has interfered with
our commitment to pursue the truth.”29
B. Controversy in the Biomechanical and Scientific Literature
When one expands review of the literature to other relevant
fields—most notably biomechanics—the depth of the controversy
becomes even clearer.30 As the SPR acknowledges, virtually all of the
biomechanical research has concluded that even the most vigorous
shaking cannot generate sufficient forces to reach estimated brain injury
thresholds.31 The biomechanical research, for example, reveals that
vigorous shaking generates accelerations roughly equivalent to a onefoot fall onto carpet,32 and a fall of just three to four feet generates at
least ten times the load of the most violent shaking, well within injury
thresholds.33 The SPR’s response, however, is not to acknowledge that
this creates serious doubt—and hence controversy—about pure shaking
as a mechanism of injury, but to reject the biomechanical research
because it does not comport with these physicians’ view of reality.34
29.
Id.
30.
See, e.g., D.R. Wolfson, D.S. McNally, M.J. Clifford & M.Vloeberghs,
Rigid-Body Modelling of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 219 J. ENGINEERING MED. 63, 66
(2005) (“There is still controversy as to the mechanisms of injury, specifically the
requirement for impact.”).
31.
See, e.g., Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A
Clinical, Pathological and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414
(1987); Michael T. Prange et al., Anthropomorphic Simulations of Falls, Shakes, and
Inflicted Impacts in Infants, 99 J. NEUROSURGERY 143, 149 (2003). Only two outlier
biomechanical investigations suggest that violent shaking might possibly generate
sufficient accelerations to produce significant brain injury, but in both cases those
accelerations were achieved only with impact, and both articles have been subject to
considerable criticism. Compare Jenny et al., supra note 26 and C.Z. Cory & M.D.
Jones, Can Shaking Alone Cause Fatal Brain Injury?: A Biomechanical Assessment of
the Duhaime Shaken Baby Syndrome Model, 43 MED. SCI. & L. 317 (2003), with Dutch
Johnson & Roland N. Auer, Response to Jenny et al. (DOI: 10.1089/neu.2016.4687):
Biomechanical Response of the Infant Head to Shaking: An Experimental Investigation,
35 J. NEUROTRAMA 1045 (2018).
32.
Prange et al., supra note 31, at 146–49.
33.
A.K. Ommaya et al., Biomechanics and Neuropathology of Adult and
Paediatric Head Injury, 16 BRIT. J. NEUROSURGERY 220, 226 (2002).
34. For example, when confronted with the biomechanical research that
indicates that shaking alone cannot cause the injuries and findings ascribed to SBS, Dr.
Jill Glick, Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Chicago, testified in 2009 that
“the whole point of biomechanic studies is to create what we know happens in nature
and . . . biomechanic models have yet to recreate what happens in nature and once
those biomechanic models create what we know happens, they will be very valuable for
us . . . but we do know that children are shaken and have traumatic brain injury. . . .
Not saying that every child with that trauma is shaken. I’m just saying that those that
are shaken have been and so if we can’t create that in the lab then the lab really doesn’t
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While there are indeed methodological challenges with the
biomechanical research,35 no one has yet explained why or how the
modeling might be so far off target as to produce the conclusions it has
to date, and no one has produced other models and defensibly estimated
injury thresholds to establish that shaking can cause such injuries.
Biomechanics, as a whole, quite consistently alone creates the scientific
controversy that the SPR prefers that courts not notice.36
SBS/AHT proponents respond that, even if shaking alone cannot
cause such injuries, there is no dispute that shaking with impact can
(hence the name change from SBS to AHT).37 That is certainly true.
But that does not resolve the controversies. For if impact can cause
these injuries and the constellation of medical findings—and the
biomechanical research confirms that it can—then is shaking even
relevant? And if impacts can cause these injuries, how can medicine
purport to distinguish between inflicted and accidental impacts, such as
the impact from a short fall, or those involving and not involving
shaking? Indeed, the biomechanical research shows not only that
shaking is an unlikely mechanism for these injuries, but also that even
the most vigorous shaking generates one-fiftieth of the force of shortdistance falls, such as accidental falls from furniture (beds, couches,
changing tables, etc.).38 To rely on brain and eye injuries to diagnose
SBS or AHT, despite a caregiver’s report of a short fall (as happens
with some regularity), is inherently controversial, given that the

tell us much.” Testimony of Dr. Jill Glick in Transcript of Trial at 35–36, People v.
Rieken, No. 05-CF-75 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2005).
35.
Biomechanical research utilizes dummies (such as crash test dummies),
animal tests, cadaver tests, and computer simulations, and none are of course perfectly
representative of the human infant body (although they are routinely accepted for
research in other safety areas, such as automobile, playground, and sports equipment
safety). See, e.g., Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Biomechanics Analysis
of Injury Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 71, 71 (2005). Moreover, it is true that
infant brain injury thresholds in this research are based in part on estimates and scaling
from known adult injury thresholds, while the infant brain is not just a miniature adult
brain. But the research is nonetheless well-grounded in established techniques, and no
one has yet marshaled an argument to support a conclusion that the estimated infant
injury thresholds are off by such a significant magnitude as to overcome the conclusions
of the research—that shaking alone cannot cause the injuries ascribed to it by the SBS
hypothesis.
36.
See, e.g., R.W.G. Anderson et al., Biomechanical Studies in an Ovine
Model of Non-Accidental Head Injury, 47 J. BIOMECHANICS 2578, 2578 (2014) (“Many
aspects of NAHI remain controversial and intermittently undergo revision . . .
including whether shaking alone is sufficient to injure the brain or whether an additional
head impact is required.”).
37.
Id.
Duhaime et al., supra note 31, at 413. See also Prange et al., supra note
38.
31 (explaining that the peak rotational accelerations for a shake are less than those in a
one-foot fall on to carpet).
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biomechanical research so strongly points to the short fall as the much
more plausible cause of the injuries.39
C. Uncertainty about SBS Mechanisms and Conclusions
In the end, to suggest that there is no controversy, given how little
is understood about the mechanism and pathophysiology of infant brain
injury in these cases, is to defy both reality and reason. Yet one area in
which there is true agreement is that these matters are not well
understood.40 Controversy under these circumstances is inevitable, and
it is indeed healthy for the development of scientific knowledge.
Whenever a medical conclusion lacks gold-standard (or even
somewhat-defined) criteria, the conclusion is inherently controversial—
at least in the sense that different physicians will interpret the
presenting signs in different ways and will disagree about specific
cases. And yet everyone agrees that there are no gold-standard criteria
for SBS or AHT.41 That concession is indeed part of the reason why the
SPR (and other SBS/AHT-hypothesis proponents) now go to such
lengths to distance themselves from the classic triad—the presence of
subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhages, and encephalopathy or
cerebral edema—as a valid standard, and to argue that the triad is a
“straw man” and a defense construct.42
In that regard, the SPR engages in more than a bit of revisionist
history, as the “triad” was not constructed by defense lawyers but by
39.
Prange et al., supra note 31.
40.
See, e.g., Costine-Bartell et al., supra note 25, at 816 (“Although the
exact etiologic mechanisms that cause injury in children with AHT remain
controversial, repetitive motions attempting to model aspects of shaking have been
employed in some animal models to investigate injury, but none has resulted in the
extensive SDH nor the widespread hypoxic-ischemic type damage observed after the
more severe forms of AHT in children.”); id. at 830 (“The exact pathophysiological
mechanisms by which widespread unilateral hemispheric hypoxic-ischemic injury is
initiated and propagated in children are not fully understood, but similar findings were
produced in this model in the absence of angular acceleration/deceleration.”); Gil
Binenbaum et al., Retinal Hemorrhage and Brain Injury Patterns on Diffusion-Weighted
Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Children with Head Trauma, 17 J. AAPOS 603, 603
(2013) (team of SBS/AHT adherents acknowledging that “[t]here are currently multiple
hypothesized factors in the pathogenesis of brain pathology and retinal hemorrhage in
abusive head trauma . . . [and] the relative importance of these factors cannot be
determined precisely based on the published data.”); id. at 604 (asserting an association
between retinal hemorrhages and AHT but acknowledging, “however, the mechanisms
underlying retinal hemorrhages are still not clearly established”).
See, e.g., Kent P. Hymel et al., Derivation of a Clinical Prediction Rule
41.
for Pediatric Abusive Head Trauma, 14 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 210, 212, 217
(2013) (“Gold standard definitional criteria for AHT do not exist. . . . [I]n the absence
of a gold standard, clinicians rarely confirm or exclude AHT with complete certainty
and are compelled instead to adopt a probabilistic approach to the diagnosis.”).
Choudhary, supra note 10, at 1050.
42.
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child abuse physicians and prosecutors.43 For many years those SBShypothesis proponents wrote,44 taught,45 and testified46 that the presence
43.
See P.G. Richards et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, 91 ARCHIVES DISEASE
CHILDHOOD 205, 205 (2006).
44.
See, e.g., David L. Chadwick et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome—A Forensic
Pediatric Response, 101 PEDIATRICS 321, 321 (1998) (describing a letter published by
seventy-two leading child abuse pediatricians asserting that SBS “is now a wellcharacterized clinical and pathological entity with diagnostic features in severe cases
virtually unique to this type of injury—[1] swelling of the brain (cerebral edema)
secondary to brain injury, [2] bleeding within the head (subdural hemorrhage), and [3]
bleeding in the interior lining of the eyes (retinal hemorrhages).”); Jeffrey M. Jentzen,
Pathological Findings in Fatal Shaken Impact Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 199, 201 (Stephen J. Lazoritz & Vincent
J. Palusci eds., 2001) (“[The] classical findings of retinal hemorrhages, subdural
hematoma, and brain swelling cannot be fully explained by any other medical entity.”);
B. Harding, R. Anthony Risdon, & Henry F. Krous, Shaken Baby Syndrome:
Pathological Diagnosis Rests on the Combined Triad, not on Individual Injuries, 328
BRIT. MED. J. 720, 720 (2004); Richards et al., supra note 43 (“The triad of
encephalopathy, subdural haemorrhages, and retinal haemorrhages as an indicator of
head injury has stood the test of time.”); Matthieu Vinchon et al., Confessed Abuse
Versus Witnessed Accidents in Infants: Comparison of Clinical, Radiological, and
Ophthalmological Data in Corroborated Cases, 26 CHILD’S NERVOUS SYS. 637, 637
(2010) (“The hallmarks of shaken baby syndrome (SBS) are subdural hematomas
(SDH), encephalopathy, and retinal hemorrhage (RH).”); Brian K. Holmgren,
Prosecuting the Shaken Infant Case, in THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 275, 319 (Stephen J. Lazoritz & Vincent J. Palusci
eds., 2001) (“The expert who acknowledges the classic findings of SBS including
subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhage and edema, but chooses to ignore this
constellation of findings in favor of an alternative hypothesis will appear foolish.”);
Paula Gerber & Kathryn Coffman, Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants, 23 CHILD’S
NERVOUS SYS. 499, 499 (2007) (“Clinical features that suggest inflicted head trauma
include the triad of the so-called shaken baby syndrome, consisting of retinal
hemorrhage, subdural, and/or subarachnoid hemorrhage in an infant with little signs of
external trauma.”).
45.
For example, authoritative child-abuse textbooks in the late 1990s and
early 2000s acknowledged the triad and declared it in its complete form to be
pathognomonic (distinctively characteristic) of SBS. See Robert A. Kirschner, The
Pathology of Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD 272–73 (Mary Edna Helfer et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1997) (“SBS usually produces a diagnostic triad of injuries . . . [which]
must be considered virtually pathognomonic of SBS in the absence of documented
extraordinary blunt force such as an automobile accident.”); Kenneth W. Reichert &
Meic Schmidt, Neurologic Sequelae of Shaken Baby Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 79, 83 (Stephen Lazoritz & Vincent J.
Palusci eds., 2001) (“For all practical purposes, however, retinal hemorrhages in
association with acute subdural hemorrhaging means that a violent shaking with or
without impact occurred.”); Robert H. Kirschner & Harry Wilson, Pathology of Fatal
Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 503 (Robert M. Reece
& Stephen Ludwig eds., 2d ed. 2001) (“Shaken Baby Syndrome . . . usually produces
a triad of injuries that includes cerebral edema, subdural hemorrhage, and retinal
hemorrhages. No other medical condition fully mimics all of its features.”). See also
Rob Parrish, Executive Summary of the Third National Conference on Shaken Baby
Syndrome
1
(2000),
https://www.dontshake.org/media/k2/attachments/2000SaltLakeCityProgram.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9P7-5U8P] (“Often referred to as the
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of the “triad”—and sometimes even single elements of the triad47—were
pathognomonic for abuse.48 We are gratified to see that, today,
proponents of the SBS/AHT hypothesis acknowledge that neither the
triad nor any other specific findings can be relied upon conclusively to
diagnose abuse.49 That is scientific progress, and it resolves one area of
dispute—but by no means all, for it now creates other controversies
about what physicians can rely upon to diagnose abuse.
Yet even SBS/AHT hypothesis proponents acknowledge that, in
the absence of agreed-upon criteria, the determination is inherently
controversial and difficult. As Leventhal and colleagues have observed,
“Making or refuting a diagnosis of abusive head trauma is
challenging.”50 Leventhal bemoans this reality as one of the “key
challenges” facing physicians when evaluating young children for
abuse.51 Leventhal observes:

‘triad,’ the consensus appears to be that a collection of (1) damage to the brain,
evidenced by severe brain swelling and/or diffuse traumatic axonal injury; (2) bleeding
under the membranes which cover the brain, usually subdural and/or subarachnoid
bleeding; and, (3) bleeding in the layers of the retina, often accompanied by other
ocular damage, when seen in young children or infants, is virtually diagnostic of
severe, whiplash shaking of the head.”).
46.
See DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE 7–12, 31–44 (2014) (citing examples of
courtroom testimony).
See, e.g., Arthur B. Eisenbrey, Retinal Hemorrhage in the Battered
47.
Child, 5 CHILD’S BRAIN 40, 42 (1979) (“[R]etinal hemorrhage in children under [three]
with or without other evidence of injury is pathognomonic of the battered child
syndrome.”); J.E. Carter & A.Q. McCormick, Whiplash Shaking Syndrome: Retinal
Hemorrhages and Computerized Axial Tomography of the Brain, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 279, 280 (1983) (“[B]ilateral extensive pale-centered retinal hemorrhages . . .
are considered pathognomonic of the syndrome of whiplash shaking injury and of child
abuse.”); ROB PARRISH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME:
INVESTIGATING PHYSICAL ABUSE AND HOMICIDE 8 (4th prtg. 2002) (“According to all
credible studies in the past several years, retinal hemorrhage in infants is, for all
practical purposes, conclusive evidence of shaken baby syndrome in the absence of a
good explanation,” such as severe automobile accidents and falls from several stories
onto a hard surface.). See also PAPETTI, supra note 24, at 51 n.175 (citing literature
and case testimony claiming SBS diagnosis on the basis of one or two features of the
triad).
48.
See Papetti, supra note 24, at 54 n.183 (citing much of the literature in
which the triad was deemed essentially pathognomonic for SBS/AHT).
See, e.g., Sandeep Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head
49.
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505, 571 (2011)
(“However, the mere presence alone of SDHs and RHs does not establish a diagnosis
of AHT.”).
50.
John M. Leventhal et al., Diagnosing Abusive Head Trauma: The
Challenges Faced by Clinicians, 44 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE: ABUSIVE
HEAD TRAUMA) S537, S541 (2014).
51.
Id. at S538.
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A . . . challenge occurs when families receive dissimilar
information from different clinicians about the likelihood of
abuse. When some clinicians tell families that they are
concerned about abuse and other clinicians indicate that abuse
is being ruled out or that the child is cleared, families may not
only become confused, but also have a tendency to split the
clinicians into good and bad ones. These inconsistencies in
how clinicians discuss the likelihood of abuse with families
help reinforce the view that the caregiver did nothing wrong
and that the physicians cannot even decide if the child was
abused.52
No wonder physicians who style themselves as child-abuse
specialists want to deny the validity of any disagreements or
controversies, and attempt to silence or delegitimize all who disagree.
D. Controversy in the Face of Claimed Consensus
Publication of the SPR “consensus” statement does not resolve the
controversies. It is dangerous and inappropriate to suggest that, because
the SPR has published a statement proclaiming consensus among
pediatric radiologists, the matters are settled and free of all
controversy. As has been widely observed, “[s]cience is not a
democracy.”53 Moreover, under the regime created by Daubert, the
mere say-so of a guild of experts, no matter how unified they might be,
is never enough, in law or in science; what matters is whether the
scientific claims are adequately supported by scientific evidence. As
one of us observed some years ago:
The guild test does at least claim to deal with reliability of the
process beyond individual experience, but the reliability
judgment is delegated to a group that, by definition, already
believes in the process. The guild test trades the ipse dixit of
the individual for the ipse dixit of the group.54
Or as Dr. Norman Guthkelch observed in 2012, “the issue is not
what the majority of doctors (or lawyers) think but rather what is

52.
53.

Id.
Jacek Z. Kubiak, Science is Not a Democracy, 50 INT’L J.
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 586, 587 (2006).
54.
D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic
Science after Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 777
(2000).
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supported by reliable scientific evidence . . . .”55 And as the authors of
a recent Swedish government report on the weak scientific foundation
for the SBS hypothesis put it, “we need to distinguish between
evidence-based knowledge and state-of-the-art consensus and, if we
expect to achieve a reflective equilibrium, then the consensus should be
adapted to the evidence and not vice-versa.”56
In any event, one should not be misled by the claim that the SPR
statement truly reflects “consensus,” at least not in the way the word
ordinarily suggests. The “consensus” statement was not approved or
even voted upon by all, or even a majority, of the membership of the
SPR.57 It was not even subjected to debate by the membership.58 It was,
instead, the product of a small group of true-believers in SBS/AHT,
appointed by the SPR’s governing body. Of the committee’s fifteen
members, almost all had previously staked out published opinions
defending the SBS/AHT hypothesis or attacking its critics,59 several are

55.
Gut
hkelch, supra note 28, at 207–08. See also Christopher Milroy,
Foreward to RANDY PAPETTI, THE FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME, at xiii (2018) (“[T]hese issues should not turn on past or even current
acceptance of SBS and AHT beliefs among physicians; these are matters or reliability,
not popularity.”).
56.
Niels LynØe & Anders Eriksson, Consensus Should be Adapted to the
Evidence and not Vice-Versa, 107 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 1476, 1476 (2018).
57.
Two of us (Barnes and Mack) are members of the SPR, received the
initial draft, and provided written feedback, but were never offered an opportunity to
vote on the paper before it was issued. Nor was their written response ever published or
shared with the general membership of the SPR.
58.
Id . Nor were Barnes and Mack, as members of the SPR, invited to
participate in any discussion among the membership, beyond the opportunity to submit
their ignored response letter.
59. See, e.g., Dawn Saunders, Maria Raissaki, Sabah Servaes, Catherine
Adamsbaum, Arabinda Kumar Choudhary, Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rick R. van Rijn,
Amaka C. Offiah, Throwing the Baby out with the Bath Water—Response to the
Swedish Agency for Health Technology Assessment and Assessment of Social Services
(SBU) Report on Traumatic Shaking, 47 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1386, 1388 (2017);
Thomas. L. Slovis et al., The Creation of Non-Disease: An Assault on the Diagnosis of
Child Abuse, 42 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 903, 903 (2012); Robert W. Block & Vincent
J. Palusci, Child Abuse Pediatrics: A New Pediatric Subspecialty, 148 J. PEDIATRICS
711, 711 (2006); Gary L. Hedlund & Lori D. Frasier, Neuroimaging of Abusive Head
Trauma, 5 FORENSIC SCI. MED. & PATHOLOGY 280, 281 (2009); Narang, supra note
49; Mark S. Dias, The Case for Shaking, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS,
TREATMENT, AND EVIDENCE 364, 364–65 (Carole Jenny ed., 2011); Christian &
Block, supra note 1 (SPR “consensus” paper co-author highlighted in bold); V.
Michelle Silvera et al., Retroclival Collections Associated with Abusive Head Trauma
in Children, 44 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE) S621, S630 (2014); Maura E.
Ryan et al., ACR Appropriateness Criteria Head Trauma—Child, 11 J. AM. C.
RADIOLOGY 939, 943 (2014); Elizabeth E. Gilles & Marvin D. Nelson, Jr., Cerebral
Complications of Nonaccidental Head Injury in Childhood, 19 PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY
119, 125 (1998). Individuals highlighted in bold were co-authors of the SPR
“consensus” paper.
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not radiologists, but child-abuse pediatricians60 and a pediatric
neurosurgeon61 who are all leading advocates of the hypothesis, and one
is not a physician,62 but is instead the only law professor who has
published widely in support of the hypothesis63 and against the growing
body of legal scholarship64 and judicial decisions65 that challenge the
hypothesis or the definitiveness of the “diagnosis.”
Moreover, the process leading to the publication of the SPR
statement appears to have been designed to eliminate the possibility of
real debate and disagreement. The statement claims to have undergone
a “rigorous” consensus process, including dissemination to the SPR’s
membership “for comment and if necessary further revisions.”66 But
the membership first received notice of this document on October 17,
2017, when they received an email accompanied by a fifty-page, 21160.
Sandeep K. Narang and Cindy W. Christian.
61.
Mark S. Dias.
62.
Joëlle Anne Moreno, J.D., Florida International College of Law.
Professor Moreno’s participation as a co-author further confirms the essentially legal
nature of the paper and the purported “diagnosis.”
63.
See Joëlle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, Dissent into Confusion: The
Supreme Court, Denialism, and the False “Scientific” Controversy over Shaken Baby
Syndrome, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 153; Joëlle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren, The
Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There Is No Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby
Syndrome “Scientific” Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357.
64.
See Findley et al., supra note 3, at 241–43, 305; TUERKHEIMER, supra
note 46, at 17–31; Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby
Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2009); Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic
Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2011); Keith
A. Findley & D. Michael Risinger, The Science and Law Underlying Post-Conviction
Challenges to Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions: A Response to Professor
Imwinkelried, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1209. 1211–13 (2018); Deborah W. Denno,
Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323 (2017); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J.
Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited: Percolation Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful
Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483 (2016); Eza Bella
Zakirova, Shaken Baby Syndrome: As a Controversy in Wrongful Conviction Cases, 81
ALB. L. REV. 1027 (2017–18); Keith Findley et al., Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome
Convictions in Light of New Medical Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
219 (2012); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the
Scientific (and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156 (2010); Molly Gena,
Comment, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Medical Uncertainty Casts Doubts on Convictions,
2007 WIS. L. REV. 701; Lauren Quint, Note, Bridging the Gap: An Application of
Social Frameworks Evidence to Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1839 (2011);
Rachel Burg, Note, Un-Convicting the Innocent: The Case for Shaken Baby Syndrome
Review Panels, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 657 (2012); Genie Lyons, Comment & Note,
Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Questionable Scientific Syndrome and a Dangerous Legal
Concept, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1109; Daniel G. Orenstein, Shaken to the Core:
Emerging Scientific Opinion and Post-Conviction Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby
Syndrome, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1305 (2011).
65.
See cases cited supra note 4.
66.
Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1058 tbl.6.
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reference version of the “consensus statement.”67 The membership was
invited to submit responses, but was given only ten days, until October
27, 2017, for any such responses.68 Despite the shortness of this time,
at least two prominent members of the SPR (and co-authors of this
response)—Dr. Patrick D. Barnes at Stanford and Dr. Julie A. Mack at
Pennsylvania State University—managed to submit a substantive, fourpage, single-spaced response, identifying numerous areas of
disagreement and concern.69 In their letter, Drs. Barnes and Mack also
wrote that, “[b]ecause of the short timeframe for comment, which is
limited to SPR members, our feedback is abbreviated.”70 They added
that they were providing “these preliminary comments to meet the
October 27 deadline, but ask for an opportunity to submit a more
complete response.”71 If the consensus statement were to be published,
they added, “we ask that the response be published with the Statement
or shortly thereafter. We also recommend that comments be invited
from other interested parties.”72 The SPR ignored the letter and each of
its requests, and proceeded to publish the statement, proclaiming
“consensus.”73
The SPR also cites a survey of physicians likely to be involved in
diagnosing SBS/AHT to claim strong support for the diagnosis.74 The
survey reports strong support among child-abuse physicians for the
SBS/AHT diagnosis.75 That finding is hardly surprising, however, since
the survey was targeted to those physicians “most commonly involved
in suspected AHT cases.”76
Even within this survey, however, the data shows that one group
of physicians—the group actually trained to assess cause of death,
pathologists—diverges from the other physicians in their views about
SBS and AHT. Among the relatively small cohort of pathologists
included in this survey (n=27), fewer than half, only 40.7 percent
(eleven of twenty-seven) responded yes when asked if SBS is a valid

67.
Letter dated from Drs. Patrick D. Barnes & Julie A. Mack to the Society
for Pediatric Radiology (Oct. 27, 2017) (on file with the authors). The letter is attached
in full as Appendix 1 to this Article.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
See Choudhary et al., supra note 10.
74.
Id. at 1058 (citing Sandeep K. Narang et al., Acceptance of Shaken Baby
Syndrome and Abusive Head Trauma as Medical Diagnoses, 177 J. PEDIATRICS 273
(2016)).
75.
Id. at 1049–50.
76.
Sandeep K. Narang et al., Acceptance of Shaken Baby Syndrome and
Abusive Head Trauma as Medical Diagnoses, 177 J. PEDIATRICS 273, 274 (2016).
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diagnosis; the remainder—the majority—were divided evenly between
saying no and that they did not know or were unsure.77 A much higher
percentage of pathologists—92.6 percent—responded that the broader
diagnosis, AHT, is valid, but that tells us only that they believe that
abusive head trauma (which would include blunt force trauma to the
head) exists (which no one doubts in the abstract); it tells us nothing
about whether these pathologists believe they can reliably determine
AHT caused by shaking or shaking with impact on the basis of a few
brain and eye findings, whether they can reliably rule out alternative
causes, whether children so abused can experience a lucid interval
before collapse, etc.—that is, it tells us nothing about the subset of
issues on which there is real controversy in AHT.78 Elsewhere, other
survey research suggests that the controversy is indeed widespread
among pathologists.79 And note that this survey tells us nothing about
the views of the other group of scientists whose research
overwhelmingly
challenges
the
SBS/AHT
hypothesis—the
biomechanical engineers; they were not included in the survey at all.
This survey simply does not prove an absence of controversy in the
relevant scientific community taken as a whole.
Moreover, while the survey shows high levels of support among
child-abuse physicians for the belief that SBS and AHT are valid
diagnoses, and that shaking with or without impact is likely or highly
likely to cause subdural hematomas, retinal hemorrhages, and coma or
death, the survey masks nuances that lie at the heart of the real
controversies.
First, it is worth noting that even among this group of physicians,
belief in SBS/AHT is not universal—eighty-eight percent endorsed SBS
as a general proposition and ninety-three percent endorsed AHT as a
general proposition.80 Second, among these physicians, more reported
believing that shaking with impact was likely to produce subdural
hematoma, retinal hemorrhage, and coma or death than believed that
shaking alone could cause each of these outcomes.81 Indeed, even

77.
Id. at 277.
Id.
78.
79.
See Stephen J. Cina, Controversies in Forensic Pathology: Results of a
2010 Survey of NAME Fellows, 2 ACADEM. FORENSICS PATHOLOGY 150, 151 (2012)
(on-line survey data showing that by 2010 more than one-third of surveyed medical
examiners no longer believed that it was even “possible to cause lethal closed head
injuries in a small child by shaking alone”—let alone that they could diagnose abuse on
the basis of the triad or related medical findings).
80.
Narang et al., supra note 76, at 275.
81.
For example, just under ninety percent believed that shaking with impact
was likely or highly likely to produce subdural hematoma compared to approximately
eighty-three percent for shaking alone. And while approximately eighty-nine percent
believed that shaking with impact was likely or highly likely to lead to coma or death,
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among this group, fewer than eighty percent reported believing that
pure shaking without impact is likely or highly likely to produce coma
or death.82 Clearly, even among this group of child-abuse physicians,
the matters are not free from controversy.
Second, even among the group who responded that pure shaking or
shaking with impact was likely to produce subdural hematoma, retinal
hemorrhage, and coma or death, this survey does not tell us whether
these physicians believe that they can reliably “diagnose” SBS/AHT
based on any individual or particular collection of these findings. Nor
does it tell us other important but more nuanced specifics, such as
whether these physicians believe that injury caused by shaking would
also necessarily produce neck or spinal cord injury (which is rarely
seen in SBS/AHT). Yet questions like these are where the controversies
are most pronounced.
Finally, it is difficult to know exactly what to make of some of the
survey results. The survey shows, for example, that only 3.1 percent of
responding physicians reported a belief that short falls are likely or
highly likely to result in death or coma.83 Given that short-fall deaths
are now widely recognized in the literature and in well-documented
case reports (including videotaped short-fall deaths),84 it is hard to
believe that nearly ninety-seven percent of responding physicians
believe that short falls cannot kill. Rather, it seems more likely that
many respondents were interpreting this question to assess the
likelihood that a death in any given case might have been the result of a
short fall, given that everyone agrees that short-fall deaths are rare. But
child deaths resulting from abuse that leaves no external injury are also
rare. The real controversy, then, is how rare such short-fall deaths are,
and how physicians can distinguish between cases where a reported
short fall was the cause of a child’s coma or death and those in which it
was not. Again, that is where the real controversy lies; this survey
masks that real controversy.

fewer than eighty percent believed that shaking alone could produce such consequences.
Id. at 276.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
See, e.g., John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by ShortDistance Falls, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1 (2001); John R. Hall et al.,
The Mortality of Childhood Falls, 29 J. TRAUMA 1273 (1989); Patrick E. Lantz &
Daniel E. Couture, Fatal Acute Intracranial Injury, Subdural Hematoma, and Retinal
Hemorrhages Caused by Stairway Fall, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1648 (2011); David L.
Chadwick et al., Annual Risk of Death Resulting From Short Falls Among Young
Children: Less Than 1 in 1 Million, 121 PEDIATRICS 1213 (2008).
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E. Broad Claims, Nuanced Controversies
As this discussion suggests, to some extent the question about
whether there is controversy depends on what the precise proposition is
that is at issue. In this regard, the SPR statement is misleading. The
SPR claims that there is no dispute about the validity of the AHT
conclusions. If by this the SPR means that there is no dispute that AHT
occurs—that is, that adults can cause brain injuries to infants and
toddlers by physically abusing them, and that such abuse will
sometimes produce medically recognizable signs (even if they are not
specific for abuse)—then there is indeed no dispute. No one disputes
that child abuse is real.85 Hence, the SPR misleads when it repeatedly
labels the critics of the SBS/AHT hypothesis as “denialists.” The SPR
cites no literature or courtroom testimony—and none can be found—in
which any of the SBS/AHT critics denies that abusive head trauma and
other forms of child abuse are real, or even that violently shaking a
child is an unsafe thing to do.
But that does not mean there are no disputes. What is in dispute—
given the lack of any “gold-standard” criteria for AHT, and the
undeniable reality that all of the physical findings also have multiple
non-abusive etiologies—is whether physicians can reliably determine
the existence of SBS or AHT primarily on the basis of brain, eye, and
related findings. Also in dispute is whether shaking alone can cause the
serious brain injuries typical in these cases, at least without also causing
massive neck injury (which, again, is almost never present86), and a
host of subsidiary questions, such as the mechanism of the injury (e.g.,
is subdural hemorrhage the product of torn bridging veins or is it the
product of bleeding from the numerous more fragile vessels in the dura;
is the encephalopathy the product of physical tearing of nerves, or does
it arise from hypoxia-ischemia?87), how to interpret the possibility of
alternative causes of injury, whether a child could have experienced a
significant period of lucidity between injury and collapse, and the like.88
Those are serious scientific questions, not the thoughtless
dismissiveness of “denialists.”

85.
See Papetti et al., supra note 24, at 311–12.
86.
See Robert M. Reece, Controversies in Shaken Baby/Shaken Impact
Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 384
(Stephen Lazoritz & Vincent J. Palusci eds., 2001) (“Injuries to the neck muscles or
cervical vertebrae are distinctly uncommon in SBS/SIS.”); see also PAPETTI, supra note
24, at 51 n.175 (citing literature and cases).
87.
See Papetti et al., supra note 24, at 320–33.
88.
See Findley et al., supra note 3, at 245.
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F. Recognizing Controversy: Independent Scientific Reviews

Given all of the challenges to researching and diagnosing child
abuse, it is no wonder that when independent scientists—those steeped
in knowledge of and fidelity to rigorous scientific principles and
methods—examine SBS/AHT, they find it wanting. The most notable
among such inquiries was undertaken by the Swedish Agency for
Health Technology Assessment and Assessment of Social Services
(SBU).89 The SBU appointed a panel of leading pediatricians and
experts in forensic medicine, radiology, medical epidemiology, and
medical and research ethics to undertake a systematic review of the
medical literature to assess the underlying strength of the SBS
hypothesis and the diagnostic validity of the triad.90 After retrieving
3,773 medical papers and identifying 1065 of them as relevant, the
SBU found that only thirty met the inclusion criteria of potentially
providing evidence on the diagnostic value of the triad,91 and of those,
only two were of moderate quality; none were of high quality; and all
the rest were low quality.92 Hence, the SBU concluded, “There is
insufficient scientific evidence on which to assess the diagnostic
accuracy of the triad in identifying traumatic shaking (very low quality
evidence).”93 In particular, the SBU noted that, because the research
base is riddled with methodological flaws, including massive
circularity, the “[s]ensitivity, specificity and predictive values”
produced by the research result in “incorrect conclusions” and
“incorrect calculations of incidence.”94 In sum, the SBU concluded that
the evidentiary foundation for SBS is of “very low quality.”95
When SBS/AHT-supporting pediatricians, somewhat predictably,
lashed out at the Swedish report, its authors responded, clarifying and
re-emphasizing the weakness of the scientific basis for medical
conclusions of SBS: “As the triad is a very important criterion used by
child protection teams, the extremely high diagnostic accuracy of the

89.
Swedish Agency for Health Technology Assessment and Assessment of
Social Services, Traumatic Shaking: The Role of the Triad in Medical Investigations of
Suspected Traumatic Shaking—A Systematic Review (2016) [hereinafter SBU Report],
https://www.sbu.se/255e [https://perma.cc/J5YW-S53C].
See Måns Rosén et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Risk of Losing
90.
Scientific Scrutiny, 106 ACTA PÆDIATRICA 1905 (2017).
91.
SBU Report, supra note 89, at 17–22.
92.
Id. at 22–25.
93.
Id. at 5.
94.
Id. at 30.
95.
Id. at 61.
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triad is obviously not based on scientific criteria but rather on circular
reasoning. In other words, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy.”96
Previously, in Canada, in 2008, the government of Ontario
conducted an exhaustive inquiry into pediatric forensic pathology in the
province.97 The product was a 674-page report, which became known
as the Goudge Inquiry, after Court of Appeal Judge Stephen Goudge,
who was Commissioner of the inquiry.98 The inquiry was instigated by
concerns about the pediatric pathology system in general, and in
particular about one apparently rogue pediatric forensic pathologist—
Dr. Charles Smith—who dominated the field in Ontario for years.99 But
in the course of investigating the field, the Goudge Inquiry identified
the same potential problems with SBS that have fueled the debates
elsewhere for the past two decades. The Report noted that “one of the
deepest controversies surrounding pediatric forensic pathology concerns
shaken baby syndrome,”100 and described the matter as “fraught with
controversy.”101
Most recently, in the United States, in 2016, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)—a group of
respected scientists from a variety of disciplines—issued a report
assessing the scientific status of a host of traditional forensic
disciplines, focusing particularly on feature-comparison disciplines.102
Although SBS/AHT is not a feature-comparison discipline, PCAST was
concerned enough about the scientific underpinnings of the SBS/AHT
hypothesis that it observed: “PCAST notes that there are issues related
to the scientific validity of other types of forensic evidence that are
beyond the scope of this report but require urgent attention—including
notably arson science and abusive head trauma commonly referred to as
‘Shaken Baby Syndrome.’”103 A medical conclusion truly well96.
Niels LynØe et al., Authors’ Overarching Reply to All the Responses
Received to the Systematic Literature Review on Shaken Baby Syndrome, 106 ACTA
PÆDIATRICA 1031, 1031 (2017).
97.
STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, THE INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY
IN
ONTARIO
(2008),
https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/report/v1_en_pdf/Vol_1_E
ng.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRJ8-788X].
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 3–8.
100.
Id. at 527.
101.
Id. at 528.
102.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF
ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE
COMPARISON
METHODS
(Sept.
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_
forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AKM-LVJC].
Id. at 23 n.15.
103.
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grounded in scientific research and free of significant doubt or
controversy is hardly the kind of field whose “scientific validity”
requires “urgent attention.”
Again, the insights of Dr. Guthkelch are helpful:
“Getting it right” requires that we distinguish between
hypotheses and knowledge. SBS and AHT are hypotheses that
have been advanced to explain findings that are not yet fully
understood. There is nothing wrong in advancing such
hypotheses; this is how medicine and science progress. It is
wrong, however, to fail to advise parents and courts when
these are simply hypotheses, not proven medical or scientific
facts, or to attack those who point out problems with these
hypotheses or who advance alternatives.104
G. Judicial Recognitions of the Shifting Science and Attendant
Controversy
In light of all these concerns, when courts have been pressed to
assess the debates about SBS/AHT, most notably in postconviction
proceedings in which the defendant seeks a new trial because new
research reflects legitimate controversy while the state’s evidence at
trial presented the matters as settled science, they invariably find
emerging and growing legitimate debate—or even that many aspects of
the old SBS hypothesis have been proven false.105 The SPR would write
these off as the decisions of guileless judges hoodwinked by
deliberately misleading defense arguments and theories. But these
decisions almost always issue after the court has heard extensive
testimony from leading and knowledgeable experts on both sides of the
debates, including extensive consideration of the relevant medical and
scientific literature. And often their rulings are based on admissions
that even prosecution experts have had to make about shifting
understandings and evolving research in the field. While science can
indeed be challenging for judges, these are not uninformed decisions.
In the first such case to recognize the controversies and overturn a
conviction, for example, involving a respected and much-loved in-home
daycare provider named Audrey Edmunds, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals vacated the conviction on the basis of new research challenging
the triad-based medical-expert opinions that had formed the heart of the
State’s case at Edmunds’s trial in 1997.106 The postconviction
104.
Guthkelch, supra note 28, at 207.
105.
See cases discussed supra note 4 and accompanying text.
106.
See State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). Full
disclosure: One of us (Findley) was counsel for Edmunds in that case, and another
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proceedings nearly a decade later produced expert evidence from ten
doctors—six for the defense and four for the State, over four days of
testimony.107 Reviewing that record, the appellate court ruled that:
Edmunds presented evidence that was not discovered until
after her conviction, in the form of expert medical testimony,
that a significant and legitimate debate in the medical
community has developed in the past ten years over whether
infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone, whether
an infant may suffer head trauma and yet experience a
significant lucid interval prior to death, and whether other
causes may mimic the symptoms traditionally viewed as
indicating shaken baby or shaken impact syndrome.108
In Rochester, New York, in 2014, a court held a postconviction
hearing spanning three weeks, at which it heard, in addition to the four
experts who had testified at trial in 2001–2002, from an additional
thirteen experts—eight for the defense and five for the prosecution.109
At the conclusion of those proceedings, the court granted a new trial,
finding that “the credible evidence adduced at the Hearing, which was
supported by expert testimony from different disciplines and
specialties—pediatrics, radiology, pathology, ophthalmology, and
biomechanical engineering established by a preponderance of the
evidence that key medical propositions relied upon by the Prosecution
at Trial were either demonstrably wrong, or are now subject to new
debate.”110 The trial court’s decision was affirmed on appeal.111
Among the more dramatic of such cases was the holding of a
federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois in 2014. After hearing
from multiple experts, the court held that Jennifer Del Prete had proved
her actual innocence in an SBS case sufficiently to permit her to
proceed in federal habeas corpus despite having procedurally defaulted
her constitutional claims in state court.112 In addition to finding—based
on consideration of the extensive expert testimony presented—that Del
(Barnes) was one of the experts who testified on behalf of Edmunds in the
postconviction proceedings.
107.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 596.
108.
109.
See People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715–22 (2014). Full disclosure:
One of us (Findley) was co-counsel for the defendant, Rene Bailey, in that case, and
two of us (Barnes and Mack) were expert witnesses for the defense in the
postconviction proceedings.
Id. at 726.
110.
People v. Bailey, 144 A.D.3d 1562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
111.
Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Full
112.
disclosure: One of us (Barnes) testified as an expert witness for the defense in this case,
and another (Mack) consulted with experts for the defense but did not testify.
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Prete was probably innocent of the SBS offense, the court added in a
footnote that “the . . . recent [scientific] developments in this area . . .
arguably suggest[] that a claim of shaken baby syndrome is more an
article of faith than a proposition of science.”113
Just as this article was going to print, the en banc Court of Appeals
of the State of Mississippi issued a decision holding that it was error to
admit the opinion of a pediatrician purporting to “diagnose” SBS. In
the course of its ruling, the Court observed that the record included
“evidence that showed the reliability of SBS as a diagnosis is being
increasingly challenged and questioned . . . .”114 The court also
observed that the prosecution’s pediatrician “agreed that many articles
in many different disciplines, from neuropathology to biomechanical
engineering, discount SBS as a reliable diagnosis.”115 Further, the court
noted that it had been presented with “numerous cites to studies and
peer-reviewed articles, that reflected the scientific community may no
longer wholly accept SBS.”116
In sum, despite the SPR’s claim of “consensus,” the reliability of
SBS/AHT diagnoses is very much a matter of serious and widespread
controversy, in both medical and legal fora.
II. IS AHT A “MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS” OR A “LEGAL CONCLUSION”?
A. The SPR’s Claims
The SPR emphatically proclaims that the AHT conclusion “is a
medical conclusion, not a legal determination . . . .”117 The significance
of this claim is two-fold. First, it supposedly justifies permitting
physicians to render opinions about the etiology of a child’s brain
injuries based on determinations that are often made by
multidisciplinary child-abuse-prevention teams that include not only
physicians, but also social workers, police officers, and prosecutors.118

113.
Id. at 957–58 n.10.
114. Clark v. State, 2017-KA-00411-COA, 2019 WL 5566234, ¶ 33 (Miss. Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 2019).
115. Id. ¶ 41.
116. Id. ¶ 47.
117.
Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1049.
118.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, FORMING A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
TEAM TO INVESTIGATE CHILD ABUSE 5–6 (Nov. 1998) (“In many States, the
membership of MDT’s [Multi-Disciplinary Teams] is defined by statute. Generally,
laws authorizing or requiring the formation of investigative MDT’s specify that law
enforcement, child protection or family services, and prosecution participate. Even if
your State does not require such membership, these three disciplines and the medical
professions should be considered the core of any investigative MDT.”).

2019:1211

Feigned Consensus

1237

The resulting determinations are often made on the basis of facts well
beyond the presenting medical conditions, such as caregiver demeanor
or perceived inconsistencies in the caregiver’s narrative of events.119
Second, it lays the groundwork for telling lawyers and courts that they
cannot second-guess the physicians and must defer to their judgment on
whether a child has been abused. Together, these factors then justify
permitting the physician to go beyond what other witnesses are
permitted to do—to render opinions, and not just testimony based on
personal knowledge, under Fed. R. Evid. 703 and Daubert120 or
Frye,121 depending on the jurisdiction.
Hence, the SPR proclaims that “[t]he diagnosis of AHT is a
medical diagnosis made by a multidisciplinary team of pediatricians and
pediatric subspecialty physicians, social workers and other
professionals based on consideration of all the facts and evidence.”122
The “other professionals” mentioned in this sentence are typically
police and prosecutors, although the SPR statement chooses not to
make that explicit. The SPR elaborates that “[a] diagnosis of AHT is a
medical conclusion, not a legal determination of the intent of the
perpetrator or, in the false hyperbole of the courtroom and
sensationalistic media, ‘a diagnosis of murder.’”123 Later, the SPR
devotes an entire subsection to the topic under the heading, “AHT is a
medical diagnosis not a legal finding of murder.”124
The SPR statement’s argument for this claim is that “[t]he medical
expert in a child abuse case plays just one role—to help the judge or
jury answer the medical question of whether an infant’s injuries were
most likely caused by abuse or they could be plausibly explained by a
recognized disease or by one or more of the myriad hypothetical
alternative causal explanations typically proffered by the defense.”125
The statement reasons:
It is absurd to argue that a medical diagnosis proves murder.
Medical expert testimony on the etiology of the injury cannot
answer the two foundational legal questions of actus reus
(Latin for guilty act) or mens rea (Latin for guilty mind). That
is because, even after the factfinder decides that the medical
evidence supports a finding that an infant’s injuries were
inflicted, non-medical evidence is required to determine who
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 4–6, 11.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1049 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1059 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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committed the act and to determine the level of intent (e.g.,
knowing, reckless or negligent).126
The statement elaborates:
To cite an analogous example that disproves the argument’s
premise, the toxicologist who testifies that the victim was
poisoned does not diagnose murder because the court must
still decide the actus reus (how was the poison ingested?) and
the mens rea (was the victim’s poisoning accidental,
negligent, reckless or intentional?).127
B. Foundational Question—Is the Conclusion of SBS/AHT Even a
“Diagnosis” as that Term is Used in Medicine?
Before addressing the claim that the SBS/AHT conclusion is not in
any way a legal matter, we note that the SPR’s claims present a
foundational question—is the abuse determination a medical
“diagnosis”? The SPR certainly claims as much, but the use of the term
“diagnosis” is wrong, for these cases do not involve a medical
diagnosis in the true sense.128 Rather, they involve a causation inquiry
that goes beyond diagnosis, and ventures into etiology—a matter that in
most contexts, including these, exceeds the training and expertise of
clinical physicians.129 As generally used in medicine, diagnosis refers to
the process of determining the disease or dysfunctional condition from
which a patient suffers in order to determine the best course of
126.
Id. (emphasis in original).
127.
Id. (emphasis in original).
128.
Note that, even if AHT/SBS were truly a medical diagnosis, at least
according to physicians, that would not resolve the problem with opinion evidence in
court on those matters. The Rules of Evidence, and not the role-inflating claims of
some physicians themselves, determine the scope of admissible expert opinion
evidence. That the determination of abuse is not a true medical diagnosis merely adds at
a foundational level to the problems with the expert opinion evidence being propounded
by child abuse physicians in SBS/AHT cases. We take up this matter in the next section
of this Article.
129.
The authors of the “consensus” piece characterize AHT as a “diagnosis”
thirty-seven times but recognize its fundamental nature as an etiology seven times in
their text. Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1048–52, 1054–55, 1057–60. Consider
this, from their abstract: “A multidisciplinary team bases this diagnosis on history,
physical examination, imaging and laboratory findings. Because the etiology of the
injury is multifactorial (shaking, shaking and impact, impact, etc.) the current best and
inclusive term is AHT.” Id. at 1049.
This is an interesting ploy, using what is essentially word magic to capture the
benefits of the diagnostic function as a presumptive part of medical training and
expertise, but at the same time asserting that etiological inference (or conjecture)
without benefit of empirical research is a legitimate part of “diagnosis.”
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treatment to cure or relieve the disease or condition.130 The disease or
condition is inferred from signs, symptoms, risk factors, and the results
of diagnostic tests. Signs are objective conditions or manifestations
observed by the physician either directly or with the aid of senseenhancing instruments such as a stethoscope. Symptoms are subjective
reports of pain, weakness, or other conditions associated with the
complaint of the patient in regard to a dysfunctional condition or
disease. Risk factors (beyond those represented directly by signs or
symptoms) are such things as family history of disease, exposure to
disease-causing agents, etc., which are usually derived from the
patient’s history as recounted by the patient (or next of kin), or derived
from the patient’s previous medical records. To be appropriately
considered in diagnosis, risk factors must have been established as
being such by previous empirical research.131 Finally, diagnostic tests,
which are often the result of microscopic or chemical analysis of bodily
fluids or tissues or microorganism cultures derived from the body of the
patient, give results correlated by previous research with certain
diseases or conditions. They are usually performed by someone other
than the treating physician and are often now instrumented to a greater
or lesser degree.
One thing to note at the outset is that diagnosis is not directly
concerned with the cause of a disease or condition, although some
diagnoses will entail causes established by previous research, and some
diagnostic tests will reveal the presence of a causal agent associated
with the condition by previous research. The point is that diagnostic
judgment itself does not address causation independent of previous
research on the cause of a disease or constellation of signs and
symptoms.132
Here we must be clear on the sense in which we are using the term
“cause.” It is not uncommon to say that when a particular disease has
been identified as the source of a person’s signs and symptoms, the
diagnosis has identified the “cause” of those signs and symptoms. In a
non-technical and extended sense this is not incorrect, but not in the
sense covered by the concept of etiology, which deals with the question
of what original conditions cause the disease itself. Malaria provides a
helpful example.133 For centuries malaria was easily diagnosed in
130.
Findley & Risinger, supra note 64, at 1219.
131.
Id.
132.
See Anthony G. Hopp, Jeremy S. Goldkind & David M. Cummings,
Differential Diagnosis and Daubert: Preventing the Misuse of Differential Etiology to
Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 84 DEF. COUNS. J. 1, 6 (2017).
133.
Many other such stories from the great age of the identification of
infectious microorganisms that were the cause of well-known diseases could be set out
here, such as cholera, tuberculosis, etc. See Malaria, WIKIPEDIA.COM,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaria [https://perma.cc/6FYQ-XLPM].
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typical cases involving malarial paroxysm—shaking chills alternating
with high fever and sweats over a two- or three-day cycle. However,
the cause, in any useful sense, was unknown (the very name indicates
the cause was assigned to “bad air.”) Identifying the cause of malaria in
detail is a triumph of modern medical research, beginning in 1880 with
Laveran’s observation of parasites in the blood of infected individuals,
and continuing in the subsequent decades as the different species of
Plasmodium responsible for the variations of the disease, and the role
of mosquitos in spreading the infection was worked out in detail.134 So a
physician in 1875 could diagnose the disease, and even treat some cases
fairly well with quinine, but had no well-warranted idea of the cause of
the disease itself—its etiology.
Pneumonia provides another useful example. The symptoms and
signs of pneumonia can include cough, shortness of breath, fever and
abnormal lung sounds. A clinician may order diagnostic tests including
bloodwork, culture, X-ray or sometimes a CT exam. The diagnosis is
based on all of these clinical signs and symptoms as well as diagnostic
testing. But the particular etiology of that pneumonia need not be
identified to treat the patient (and few physicians would claim to be able
to “diagnose” how a particular pneumonia developed in any one
patient). Regardless of cause, the treatment would be for the illness—
typically a broad-spectrum antibiotic. And that is as far as the
causation inquiry would go; the physician would not venture into
“diagnosing” how or what introduced that organism into the body.
Child abuse physicians, by contrast, take that one extra step—by
analogy to the pneumonia case, they assume they know how the patient
acquired the pneumonia.
The iterative process known as differential diagnosis also is not
designed to address etiology. “Differential diagnosis refers to the
process whereby the physician ideally determines a wide range of
diseases or conditions that might account for a set of signs and
symptoms, rank orders them by probability (or sometimes severity),
and proceeds to attempt to rule out the members of the list by further
tests.”135
In practice, whether one actually rules out of every possibility
except one will depend on the remoteness of initial
probabilities and the availability and expense of diagnostic
tests . . . [O]ften the most life-threatening or the most
probable disease after convenient diagnostic testing has been
done will be treated first . . . [O]nly when treatment fails will
that disease be eliminated and either further more rigorous or
134.
135.

Id. See the history section of the Wikipedia article on malaria.
Findley & Risinger, supra note 64, at 1220.
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costly testing, or treatment for the next most likely disease, be
undertaken. Note that differential diagnosis involves a
feedback loop where initial diagnostic hypotheses are
modified in light of newly acquired information. And most
importantly, skill in differential diagnosis (or diagnosis
generally) does not provide one with special skill in
determining causation in regard to the disease or condition
finally settled on and treated successfully. The skill is in
determining the disease or condition in the patient, and
knowing how to treat it successfully, not in determining its
cause. Determining cause (the “etiology” of a disease) is a
specialty of scientific medical research, not of practical
diagnosis by practicing physicians.136
Of course, once such etiology has been established by welldesigned medical research, it may become a part of the process of
diagnosis. This applies both to the testing for known pathogens as part
of diagnosis (illustrated above in the pneumonia example), as well as
discovering exposure to previously established risk factors.
Of course, practicing physicians may be willing to opine on the
causation of conditions like various cancers that have not yet been
established by research, and they may invoke their diagnostic skills in
the process, but this is misplaced; determining the etiology of a disease
that has not yet been established by formal research is beyond the scope
of the practitioner’s training and expertise and represents no more than
a conjectural hypothesis at best.137 There is no training, formal or
otherwise, in the practice of “differential etiology” in medical school.

136.
Id. (footnote omitted).
137.
Id. at 1220–21. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit explained in the course of holding that it was error to permit a physician to
opine that a specific slip-and-fall accident was the cause of the plaintiff’s fibromyalgia
(a nonspecific, chronic-pain illness):
The court’s task was to determine whether Dr. Reyna’s methodology tied
the fall at Food Lion by some specific train of medical evidence to Black’s
development of fibromyalgia. No one doubts the utility of medical histories
in general or the process by which doctors rule out some known causes of
disease in order to finalize a diagnosis. But such general rules must, under
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Moore, be applied fact-specifically in each case.
The underlying predicates of any cause-and-effect medical testimony are
that medical science understands the physiological process by which a
particular disease or syndrome develops and knows what factors cause the
process to occur. . . . In this case, neither Dr. Reyna nor medical science
knows the exact process that results in fibromyalgia or the factors that
trigger the process. Absent these critical scientific predicates, . . . no
scientifically reliable conclusion on causation can be drawn.
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Indeed, in civil cases, courts have recognized the important
distinction between differential etiology and differential diagnosis, and
that the former is a much more dubious proposition.138 The difference is
significant.139 The differential diagnosis, as a rule, “does not provide an
adequate basis for establishing external causation.”140 Rather, the
differential diagnosis “focus[es] on diagnosing the disease, not on
determining the etiology or cause of the disease.”141 “[D]ifferential
etiology,” by contrast, “describe[s] the investigation and reasoning that
leads to the determination of external causation, sometimes more
specifically described by the witness or court as a process of identifying
external causes by a process of elimination.”142 As one civil court put it
bluntly, “[t]he differential diagnosis method has an inherent reliability;
the differential etiology method does not.”143
To understand why, consider Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp.144 The
case was a tort action by a railroad employee against his employer,
seeking damages for injuries he claimed he sustained from the
vibrations of the train on which he worked.145 The court held that the
differential diagnosis could be used to determine the nature of the
plaintiff’s medical condition. But determining that the locomotive’s
vibrations were the cause-in-fact of those injuries was another matter,
beyond the scope of the differential diagnosis and the physician’s
expertise.146 The court noted that, when diagnosing a patient for
treatment purposes, the doctor has special incentives that provide
Black v. Food Lion, 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). It is widely recognized that the
pathophysiology of SBS/AHT, like the pathophysiology of fibromyalgia, is not well
understood. See supra notes 27 and 40 and accompanying text.
138.
See, e.g., Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1360–61
(M.D. Ga. 2007), aff’d, 300 F. App’x 700 (11th Cir. 2008); Hendrix ex rel. v. Evenflo
Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2010); C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807
F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2015); Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 673 (6th Cir.
2010); Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., 794 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2015); Myers v.
Illinois Central R.R., 629 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2010); see also TUERKHEIMER, supra
note 46, at 75.
139.
The discussion of this issue that follows is adapted from Keith A.
Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 184, 190–93 (Daniel S. Medwed, ed. 2017).
140.
TUERKHEIMER, supra note 46, at 76; see also Hopp, supra note 127, at 6.
141.
Id.
142.
McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Mary Sue Henifin, et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 439, 481 (Federal Judicial Center 2d
ed., 2000)).
143.
Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1361; see also TUERKHEIMER, supra note 46,
at 76; Findley, supra note 139, at 191.
144.
Bowers, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
145.
Id. at 1344–45.
146.
Id. at 1362.
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assurances of accuracy: misdiagnosis can lead to catastrophic illness for
the patient, even death, from failure to prescribe the correct
treatment.147 And that error can in turn lead to medical malpractice
liability.148 When a physician opines that a train worker’s physical
injuries were caused specifically by the train’s vibrations, or that a
child’s brain injuries were caused by abuse, however, she is not
diagnosing the patient for treatment purposes. In the SBS/AHT case,
the diagnosis is brain injury, and it is that injury that is treated.
Whether an injury was inflicted or sustained accidentally has no bearing
on the way a patient is treated medically.
This reality has other implications undermining the reliability of
the differential etiology. The true differential diagnosis—diagnosing a
patient’s medical illness or condition for purposes of prescribing
treatment—at least has the potential for enabling the doctor to learn
from experience, and thus improves reliability. If the doctor
misdiagnoses an illness or condition, the treatment will likely fail, and
the doctor will adjust the diagnosis and the treatment accordingly. But
because there is no similar treatment feedback loop to differentiate
between abusive and non-abusive injuries, judgments about causation
(etiology) do not offer similar opportunities for learning and for
ensuring experience-based reliability.
Medical professionals have recognized this challenge even in the
context of true diagnosis. Eta Berner and Mark Graber, for example,
have observed that, where feedback is absent or minimal,
overconfidence by the physician can be a significant source of
diagnostic error: “[F]eedback that is delayed or absent may not be
recognized for what it is, and the perception that ‘misdiagnosis is not a
big problem’ remains unchallenged. That is, in the absence of
information that the diagnosis is wrong, it is assumed to be correct . . .
.”149 And Gordon Schiff has explained how the absence of feedback can
undermine reliability, even in the true diagnosis context:
An open-loop system (also called a “nonfeedback controlled”
system) is one that makes decisions based solely on
preprogrammed criteria and the preexisting model of the
system. This approach does not use feedback to calibrate its

147.
Id. at 1361.
148.
Id.
149.
Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of
Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S10 (2008).
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output or determine if the desired goal is achieved. . . . [Such
a system] cannot engage in learning.150
Because opining about the etiology of a child’s brain findings
provides no feedback mechanism, the entire enterprise is untethered
from empirical confirmation. Without the feedback required to “engage
in learning,” the expert’s opinions based on clinical judgment can
amount to little more than ipse dixit, which the Supreme Court has
recognized as problematic under the Federal Rules of Evidence.151
As problematic as the causation determination can be in tort cases,
that determination, employing a differential etiology methodology, is
even more challenging in SBS/AHT cases. The reason is simple. In the
typical tort case, the question posed to the expert is whether a known
historical fact connects causally to a known injury or outcome. But in
SBS/AHT cases, the historical fact at issue—whether the accused
violently shook or shook and slammed the child—is itself unproven and
unknown. In the SBS/AHT context, the expert is asked to relate cause
to effect when only the effect has been observed; it asks the expert to
divine not only the relationship between the precipitating event and the
outcome, but to divine even the existence of the alleged precipitating
event itself, which has not been observed or otherwise proven.
In the Bowers scenario, for example, the train engineer in fact
suffered the injuries of which he complained, and he was in fact
exposed to the vibrations that he claimed caused those injuries.
Similarly, in a toxic tort case, typically there is no dispute that the
plaintiff in fact contracted cancer, or was born with birth defects, and
that the plaintiff was in fact exposed to the toxins or carcinogens. The
question for the expert in either scenario is whether the known
exposure caused the known outcome. Nonetheless, that is the type of
causation claim that Douglas Weed observes is so difficult to make,
because it “does not have [the] sort of connection back to some unique
event that can be documented, verified, and directly observed.”152
But in SBS/AHT cases, the expert’s opinion is needed precisely
because the existence of the act of shaking or abusing the child is
otherwise not established. The children in such cases cannot describe
what happened, because they are either pre-verbal or deceased (or
both). The medical expert must not only infer that shaking caused the
150.
Gordon D. Schiff, Minimizing Diagnostic Error: The Importance of
Follow-up and Feedback, 121 AM. J. MED. S38, S38 (2008).
151.
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“But nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert.”).
152.
Douglas L. Weed, Truth, Epidemiology, and General Causation, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 943, 949 (2008).
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child’s injuries, but that the shaking even occurred in the first instance.
As a category of cases, therefore, SBS/AHT cases present in stark form
the tensions that lie at the interface between law and science.
In other words, at least in civil cases the clinical practitioner’s
musings about etiology generally concern hypotheses about causal
mechanisms that, however much they have not been tested empirically,
at least could in theory be tested empirically. The “abuse” conclusion
entailed in AHT testimony involves conclusions about subjective mental
states that are not subject to the protocols of medical research even in
theory. In regard to such mental states, which are what define criminal
responsibility legally, physicians and medical researchers are in no
better position to make inferences from the factual circumstances
surrounding a death than are ordinary human beings applying critical
common sense. Such issues are reserved for the jury without opinions
being offered by putative experts whose opinions are beyond the scope
of their expertise, and invite inappropriate deference by jurors.153
An instructive case dealing with what is essentially the same issue
in the testimony offered by a forensic pathologist is State v. Tyler,154 a
case decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa involving the sudden
unexplained death of an infant. In that case the trial court had permitted
the Medical Examiner to testify to his conclusion that the “manner of
death” was homicide.155 The Iowa high court held that this was error
because the conclusion was not a medical opinion based on specialized
knowledge; it was instead a non-expert opinion based mostly on
information derived from law enforcement investigators—information
that the Medical Examiner’s medical expertise did not enable him to
evaluate more reliably than the jury.156 As there, so here.
Because the nature of the conclusions offered by physicians in
court under the label Abusive Head Trauma do not involve diagnosis,
and are in part conclusions about subjective mental states beyond the
scope of medical etiology, we have generally referred to them in this
paper simply as “AHT conclusions or determinations,” except where
direct quotation or context necessitates the use of the term “diagnosis.”

153.
Judges often refer to such opinions variously as “invading the province of
the jury,” “outside the scope of the witnesses’ expertise and specialized knowledge,”
“not beyond the ken of the average juror,” “not helpful to the jury,” and other such
phrases. See, e.g., Kimble v. Earle M. Jorgenson Co., 830 N.E.2d 814, 823 (2005);
Lee v. Andersen, 616 F.3d 803, 808–09 (8th Cir. 2010); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
154.
867 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 2015).
Id. at 145–47.
155.
Id. at 163–64.
156.
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C. The Legal Essence of the “Diagnosis”

By invoking “diagnosis,” the “consensus” document is using what
is essentially word magic to capture the benefits of the diagnostic
function as a presumptive part of medical training and expertise, but at
the same time asserting that etiological inference (or conjecture)
without benefit of empirical research is a legitimate part of “diagnosis.”
But putting aside whether the definition of “diagnosis” can be stretched
in some extended sense to cover AHT conclusions, it remains the case
that most of the core AHT conclusions constitute legal characterizations
and not objective scientific facts. Despite the SPR’s claims that the
SBS/AHT conclusion says nothing about legal matters like actus reus
and mens rea or identity of the purported abuser, the very term
“abusive head trauma,” or its alternative formulations in the medical
literature, such as “non-accidental head injury” (NAHI), “inflicted
traumatic brain injury” (ITBI), and the like, do precisely what the SPR
says they do not do. To opine that the abuse was “inflicted”—whether
by violent shaking or impacting the child’s head, or both, which are the
inferred mechanisms of injury in AHT—adds nothing but the legal
requirements of actus reus, mens rea, and even (albeit somewhat less
directly) identity.
First, to label the etiology as “inflicted” or “abusive” or “nonaccidental” serves precisely to opine as to the actus reus, the guilty act.
The medical opinion purports to tell us precisely that which the law
requires—what action did the accused take? While the medical
hypothesis no longer claims to be able to specify whether the
mechanism of injury was shaking or impact or both (hence the shift in
the nomenclature from SBS to the more-inclusive AHT), it tells us all
that the law requires to satisfy the actus reus requirement—that
someone applied violent force to harm the child.157
Second, the term “abusive head trauma” or any of its formulations
also by their very nature satisfy the mens rea element of the crime of
child abuse (or its variants). Child abuse statutes set the requisite
mental state for criminal conduct at various levels, from intentional to
reckless to negligent or knowing. Purely blameless accidental conduct
is never criminal. The SPR statement contends that when a physician
opines that “an infant’s injuries were inflicted,” he or she is not
offering evidence about or diagnosing the mental state needed to

157.
In this regard, a very recent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in an
abusive head trauma case is telling. In that case, the court observed that “the case
against the [defendants] was entirely circumstantial, and the only evidence that a crime
had been committed at all was the expert medical testimony of Dr. Darrisaw, the
State’s medical expert who performed the autopsy.” Debelbot v. State, 826 S.E.2d 129,
134 (Ga. 2019) (emphasis added).
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establish a crime.158 But then what exactly are the conclusions that the
injuries were “inflicted” and were “abusive” doing? Their only
purpose, in addition to establishing the actus reus, is to prove the
mental state of the alleged abuser; they serve no other purpose, medical
or otherwise. These are quintessentially legal questions, not medical
questions;159 they have no medical implications at all, since there is no
difference in treatment for the brain injuries a child suffers depending
on whether any trauma the child suffered was applied intentionally
(inflicted) or accidentally. But this does answer the mens rea question:
if the injury is inflicted or the result of abuse, then the caregiver acted
not accidentally, but with a guilty mind. And the only consequences of
this determination are solely legal: if the injury is inflicted, the child
might be removed from the parents, or the caregivers might be
prosecuted criminally.
Elsewhere, the child abuse literature written by strong proponents
of the SBS/AHT hypothesis confirms that doctors, including child
abuse pediatricians, realize how the “diagnosis” resolves legal
questions. Indeed, previously the SPR’s own ad hoc Committee on
Child Abuse, in 2005, acknowledged in writing that “[t]he testimony of
pediatric radiologists can be crucial in the differentiation of child abuse
from accidental fractures, metabolic diseases, and other bone disorders.
In cases where child abuse is suspected, a physician’s opinion will often
be determinative.”160 Likewise, child abuse pediatrician John Leventhal
at Yale notes that, when evaluating a child for suspected abuse, the
physician must consider what he calls “[t]wo important questions”:
“First, are the child’s findings due to trauma or a medical problem (or
a combination of the two)? Second, if trauma, are the injuries due to
abuse as opposed to neglect, an unintentional (or accidental) cause or
birth trauma?”161

158.
Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1059.
159.
In this regard, the observations of a team of medical and scientific experts
appointed by the Swedish government to investigate the scientific foundations for the
SBS hypothesis are apt:
The term [SBS], however, is problematic as it includes both the medical
findings and the alleged, but scientifically unproven, injurious mechanism—
and even the intent behind this mechanism.
Hence, we ought to differ between the injurious mechanism (traumatic
shaking) and the medical findings (the symptoms and signs, “the triad”).
Intent is not, for obvious reasons, for the medical community to decide.
Niels LynØe, Niklas Juth, & Anders Eriksson, From Child Protection to Paradigm
Protection—The Genesis, Development, and Defense of a Scientific Paradigm, J. MED.
& PHIL. 378, 379 (2019) (emphasis in original).
160.
Kenneth L. Mendelson, Critical Review of “Temporary Brittle Bone
Disease,” 35 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 1036, 1036 (2005).
161.
See Leventhal et al., supra note 50, at S537 (emphasis added).
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Finally, it is misleading, at best, to suggest that the medical
opinion does not address identity; in the typical case, the medical
opinion provides all the prosecutor needs to prove identity of the
perpetrator. As the SPR statement itself asserts, most prosecution
experts reject the notion that a child so injured would have any
extended period of lucidity after injury.162 Hence, the medical opinion
purports to establish that the person with the child at or very near the
time of collapse or onset of major symptoms must have been the one
who harmed the child.163 In this regard, Dr. Leventhal’s writings again
reveal that the “diagnosis” is ultimately a conclusion about a legal
question. Leventhal highlights the importance of timing the child’s
injuries, observing, “[a]n understanding of the timing of the injury can
help answer the question of who hurt the child, which, in turn, affects
whether an alleged perpetrator will be arrested and prosecuted.”164
162.
Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1052 (“There is no evidence that
children with fatal head trauma have prolonged asymptomatic lucid intervals prior to
neurologic collapse.”). This assertion, however, is misleading at best, and flat-out
wrong at worst. There is in fact considerable evidence in the literature that children
with fatal brain injuries can have prolonged periods of lucidity prior to collapse,
ranging from minutes to hours or even days. See M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval Duration
Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and
Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 723 (1998) (reporting extensive lucid intervals in
some cases, including some of more than seventy-two hours); Robert W. Huntington,
III, Symptoms Following Head Injury, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 105
(2002) (reporting on a case in which an apparently abused thirteen-month-old child was
admitted to the hospital and was under professional medical care and supervision for
less than twenty-four hours before she collapsed and died, at which time physicians for
the first time discovered severe intracranial injury, with subdural hemorrhage, retinal
hemorrhage, and cerebral edema); Scott Denton & Darinka Mileusnic, Delayed Sudden
Death in an Infant Following an Accidental Fall, 24 AMER. J. FORENSIC MED. &
PATHOLOGY 371 (2003) (case report of a nine-month-old child who experienced a
seventy-two hour lucid interval). While it is true that the children in these
circumstances usually are not wholly symptom-free, the symptoms can be subtle and
difficult to discern in pre-verbal infants and toddlers—symptoms like clinginess,
fussiness, vomiting, interrupted sleep or eating patterns, and the like. See Huntington,
supra (explaining that physicians did not recognize the child’s severe intracranial
injuries initially because she was “fussy and clingy, but interactive and responsive”);
Gilliland, supra, at 724 (noting that during the periods of lucidity the children were
described as “not normal”). Children are not always immediately comatose or
unresponsive, as child abuse pediatricians have typically claimed in the past.
For discussion of the use of the no-lucid-intervals claim to prove identity,
163.
see Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 18 (2011) (noting “[u]nequivocal
testimony regarding timing—i.e., that symptoms necessarily would appear
instantaneously upon the infliction of injury—proves the perpetrator’s identity”);
Findley et al., supra note 3, at 225–26 (noting testimony claiming “there could be no
period of relative normality (‘lucid interval’) following the injury. It was therefore
widely accepted that the last person with the baby must have been responsible.”
(footnote omitted)).
164.
Leventhal et al., supra note 50, at S537 (emphasis added).
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Leventhal reiterates that “[i]t is useful to know who was present when
the child became symptomatic, especially if the symptoms occurred
rapidly and during a short period of time. This information can help
determine who may have hurt the child . . . .”165
A recent decision from an Ohio appellate court exemplifies this
problem with—and the all-encompassing nature of—the “medical
diagnosis” of SBS/AHT. In reversing the accused’s conviction as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court observed that the
prosecution’s child abuse pediatrician, Dr. Randall Schlievert,
“examined E.A. on the night of the incident, and concluded not only
that E.A. had suffered shaken baby syndrome, but that appellant was
the perpetrator. Upon Schlievert’s conclusion, all criminal investigation
into the cause of E.A.’s injuries stopped.”166
Insight on this is further gleaned from the writings of Dr. Norman
Guthkelch, one of the physicians credited with originating the SBS
hypothesis in a paper written in 1971, although he did not call it that at
the time.167 More than forty years later, reflecting on what had
happened to his hypothesis in the intervening years, Dr. Guthkelch
lamented that the claim to “diagnose” SBS and AHT reflects
overreaching by the medical community:
Since subdural and retinal hemorrhages (with or without
cerebral edema) may also be observed in accidental or natural
settings, I suggest that the elements of the classic triad of
retinal hemorrhage, subdural hemorrhage and cerebral edema
would be better defined in terms of their medical features.
Since subdural hemorrhages in infancy originate in the dura,
perhaps “retino-dural hemorrhage of infancy” would be an
acceptable name for the primary findings. Other medical
findings, e.g., cerebral edema, can be added to the title as
appropriate. This would allow us to investigate causation
without appearing to assume that we already know the
answer.168
Dr. Guthkelch further observed: “Tuerkheimer has pointed out the
danger of assuming criminal intent simply because the classic triad of
retino-dural hemorrhage and encephalopathy is present and no one can

165.
Id. at S538.
166.
State v. Thoss, 120 N.E.3d 1274, 1283 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
167.
See A.N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and Its Relationship
to Whiplash Injuries, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 430 (1971).
168.
Guthkelch, supra note 28, at 202 (emphasis added).
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think of any other explanation.”169 Accordingly, Dr. Guthkelch
concluded, “[a]ny medical expert who answers in the negative
questions such as ‘Given the injuries that you have described in this
case, doctor, have you any doubt that they were inflicted with intent to
kill, or at least in total disregard of that possibility?’ is exceeding his or
her authority.”170
If any question remains about the legal nature of the purported
diagnosis, one need only look to the actual courtroom testimony of
medical experts who testify on behalf of the prosecution in criminal and
family cases. Routinely, these witnesses testify, for example, that the
forces required to cause the injuries suffered by the child at issue had to
have been so massive they could not have been accidental, often likened
to the forces of an automobile accident at thirty miles per hour or more,
or throwing a child from a multi-story building.171 (Indeed, a chapter by
a prosecutor in a child-abuse textbook urged that physicians “can testify
that the forces the child experiences [from shaking] are the equivalent
169.
Id. at 203 (citing Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution
and the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 3 ALA.
L. REV. 523 (2011)).
Guthkelch, supra note 28, at 204.
170.
171.
See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 64 and cases cited therein (noting that
“[t]he most common analogies [used by prosecution experts] are to the amount [of
force] generated by high speed automobile accidents and a fall from a several-story
building). The experts analogize to these ‘real-life accident scenarios’ in order to give
the trier of fact a sense of the ‘massive, violent’ force required to produce this kind of
brain injury.” Cited cases include Mitchell v. State, No. CACR 07-472, 2008 WL
316166, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008) (examining pediatrician equated the force
necessary to produce the triad with that of a high-speed automobile accident); People v.
Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 631, 631–32 (Colo. 2004) (explaining how the prosecution
expert stated that subdural hematomas occur in “such things as falling from a several
story building or being in a high speed motorcycle accident or a child say is on a
bicycle hit by a car . . . .[W]hen we see subdurals in accidental injury, it’s from a
major trauma. It requires massive force”); In re Matter of Child, 880 N.Y.S. 2d 760,
765 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008) (explaining how the prosecution expert stated that SBS
findings “simulate being in a car crash at ‘around [thirty-five] to [forty] miles per
hour’”). See also Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Gregory Hollman at 78, State v.
Edmunds, No. 96-CF-555 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 1996) (explaining that the
forces required from shaking “would be [the equivalent of throwing a child from] right
around a three story building, three to four story building”). See also Papetti et al.,
supra note 24, at 311 n.60 (collecting other cases in which physicians testified
similarly). That testimony is also consistent with claims in the published medical
literature of the early 2000s. See, e.g., Case et al., supra note 23, at 120 (“Fatal
accidental shearing or diffuse brain injuries require such extremes of rotational force
that they occur only in obvious incidents such as motor vehicle accidents. . . . [Or
from] falling from considerable heights (greater than [ten] feet) or having some object
penetrate the head.”); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect,
Shaken Baby Syndrome: Rotational Cranial Injuries—Technical Report, 108
PEDIATRICS 206, 206 (2001) (position paper of the American Academy of Pediatrics
proclaiming that “[t]he act of shaking is so violent that individuals observing it would
recognize it as dangerous and likely to kill the child”).
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of a fifty to sixty miles per hour unrestrained motor vehicle accident, or
a fall from three to four stories onto a hard surface.”172) Routinely,
therefore, child abuse physicians testify that anyone applying or
observing those forces would have recognized that they would cause
severe harm to the child.173 The 1993 position paper of the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) even explicitly instructed pediatricians
that “the act of shaking/slamming is so violent that competent
individuals observing the shaking would recognize it as dangerous.”174
The 2001 AAP position paper doubled down on that claim, adding that
the forces would be “so violent that individuals observing it would
recognize it as dangerous and likely to kill the child.”175 The forces
could not have been accidental. The hypothesis and attendant testimony
explicitly address mens rea.176
Such claims, it turns out, are entirely unscientific and indeed
wrong. There simply is no scientific research establishing that the brain
injuries in these cases require such extreme forces. When pushed, even
prosecution experts who make such claims have to admit that there is
no science underlying these claims.177 One need only pause and think
about it for a moment to intuit the preposterousness of a claim that a
single human being can manually generate forces equivalent to a thirty
to sixty miles per hour unrestrained automobile crash or a multistory
fall. And the biomechanical research confirms what intuition tells us—
both that the most violent shaking cannot generate forces anywhere
close to those described by the child abuse physicians, and that serious
brain injuries can in fact be caused by much less obviously fatal forces,
172.
Holmgren, supra note 44, at 307.
173.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
174.
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Shaken
Baby Syndrome: Inflicted Cerebral Trauma, 92 PEDIATRICS 872, 872 (1993).
175.
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, supra note
171, at 206 (emphasis added).
176.
Holmgren, supra note 44, at 307 (child abuse prosecutor urging that such
testimony helps prove “the mens rea requirements for the charge”).
177.
For example, Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen, testifying for the prosecution in a
Wisconsin courtroom, testified as follows:
Q.
Now, there is really no scientific basis, however, for saying that’s
the amount of force it takes [e.g. the equivalent of a motor vehicle accident
or multi-story fall], is there?
A.
No. Other than the fact we see that type of injury and those kind of
injuries.
Q.
So sort of anecdotal, observational, cumulative kind of experience
kind of thing?
A.
Yes. Along with interview questionnaires with individuals who have
been involved in those kind of events.
Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen at Evidentiary Hearing at 30, State v.
Edmunds, No. 96-CF-555 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007).
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such as those from falls of just several feet.178 Regardless, the point
remains that by making such (unscientific) claims, physicians are
attempting to do nothing more than answer the actus reus and mens rea
questions, questions that are beyond their role as physicians bringing
specialized scientific knowledge to bear on issues within the scope of
their special expertise.
Thus, it is far from “the false hyperbole of the courtroom and
sensationalistic media”179 to understand SBS/AHT as a “medical
diagnosis of murder.” It is, instead, an accurate understanding of the
nature and import of the opinions rendered by child abuse pediatricians
who claim they can divine what external forces were applied to a child
by a human actor, with what state of mind, and when (leading to
identifying the perpetrator). When proffered to “diagnose” “abuse,” the
medical expert’s testimony often does indeed satisfy all of the elements
of the case: what happened, who did it, and with what state of mind?
Moreover, it was not even lawyers in the courtroom, or the
“sensationalistic media,” that first likened SBS to a medical diagnosis
of murder. It was, instead, a serious scholar and professor of law,
Deborah Tuerkheimer, then at DePaul University College of Law, now
at Northwestern University School of Law, herself once a child abuse
prosecutor in New York, who dispassionately reviewed the medical and
legal literature on the subject and first recognized that physicians were
being called upon to decide legal questions in the guise of rendering
medical opinions; it was she who labeled SBS a “medical diagnosis of
murder.”180 Thus, that likening did not originate in the “sensationalistic
media,” but in respected law journals181 and a book published by
Oxford University Press.182 The media has indeed reported on the
rupturing controversies in this field, but that media coverage has hardly
been of the tabloid variety. The most hard-hitting coverage, and hence
the coverage that prosecutors and child-abuse pediatricians typically rail
against, has included extensive pieces in the New York Times,183 the

178.
See, e.g., Duhaime et al., supra note 31; Prange et al., supra note 31;
Ommaya et al., supra note 33, at 226; Werner Goldsmith & John Plunkett, A
Biomechanical Analysis of the Causes of Traumatic Brain Injury in Infants and
Children, 25 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 89 (2004).
179.
Choudhary, supra note 10, at 1049.
180.
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 163, at 5; Tuekheimer, supra note 169, at
515–16.
See sources cited supra note 180.
181.
182.
TUERKHEIMER, supra note 46.
183.
Emily Bazelon, Shaken-Baby Syndrome Faces New Questions in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/magazine/06babyt.html?scp=1&sq=emily%20bazelon%20shaken&st=cse
[https://perma.cc/J2X3M4KF]; Clyde Haberman, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Diagnosis That Divides the
Medical
World,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
2015),
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Washington Post,184 the American Bar Association Journal,185 and
National Public Radio and Pro Publica,186 among others. We leave it to
the reader to decide for herself if this is the “sensationalistic media” to
which the SPR refers.
Finally, although it should be obvious to even a casual reader by
now, we note that the SPR’s analogy to a physician’s diagnosis that
death was caused by poisoning is inapt. In the poisoning analogy, it is
true that the physician only offers medical evidence about the subject’s
physical conditions and the chemicals found in the body that caused
death. The physician says nothing about the conduct of any outside
actor—she addresses neither the actus reus nor the mens rea of any
third party, nor the identity of anyone as the poisoner. For it is
absolutely true in that scenario that the poison could have been ingested
accidentally or suicidally, as well as homicidally. And even if a third
party gave the victim the poison, the physician tells us nothing about
the state of mind of that third person. But the “diagnosis” of SBS or
AHT does much more than that—it tells us everything we need to know
not only about the medical conditions that led to death, but also that
some third party inflicted deadly trauma, and did so with such force
that it could not have been accidental, and at a time when the accused
had to have been present. The poisoning scenario would be analogous
to SBS/AHT only if the physician purported to diagnose not just
poisoning, but “inflicted” poisoning or “abusive” poisoning, by a
person who was with the deceased at the time of death. The poisoning
analogy lays bare the logical flaw in the SPR argument; indeed, it
makes clear how the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” is different, and involves
legal rather than medical conclusions.

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/us/shaken-baby-syndrome-a-diagnosis-thatdivides-the-medical-world.html [https://perma.cc/9DDH-VSHP].
184.
Debbie Cenziper, Shaken Science: A Disputed Diagnosis Imprisons
Parents,
WASH.
POST
(March
20,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/shaken-babysyndrome/?noredirect=on (multi-part series).
Mark Hansen, Unsettling Science: Experts Are Still Debating Whether
185.
Shaken Baby Syndrome Exists, A.B.A.J., Dec. 2011, at 49–55.
Joseph Shapiro, Rethinking Shaken Baby Syndrome, NPR (June 29, 2011,
186.
12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2011/06/29/137471992/rethinking-shaken-babysyndrome [https://perma.cc/EY4H-2BER].

1254

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTROVERSIES AND LEGAL NATURE OF
THE SBS/AHT CONCLUSIONS
A. The Significance of the Legal Nature of the SBS/AHT Conclusion
The dispute about whether SBS or AHT is a medical diagnosis or a
legal determination is more than just a dispute about semantics or
taxonomy. It matters for purposes of determining what the courts will
do with such opinions. If it is a legal determination, courts cannot just
defer to the physicians. Instead, courts must decide whether it is even
permissible and appropriate for physicians to offer opinions about legal
determinations that go beyond their medical training and expertise.
1. THE LIMITATIONS OF MEDICAL EXPERTISE IN A LEGAL CONTEXT
The law explicitly recognizes that determining whether a caregiver
“has physically abused a child is a legal determination to be made by
the factfinder”—that is, the judge or jury.187 The American Law
Institute (ALI), in its newly adopted Restatement on Children and the
Law, states, therefore, that the role of the expert witness is not to make
such determinations, but is instead limited to “diagnos[ing] the child’s
medical conditions, including for example, broken bones, bruising,
internal bleeding, and swelling, as well as the medical consequences of
those conditions for the child.”188 The ALI defines the limits of the
expert’s authority in this way:
In addition to allowing a medical expert to render opinions
regarding diagnoses of the child’s bodily condition, a court
may also allow a medical expert to render opinions regarding
the external forces that may have caused the child’s
conditions. A medical expert may testify, for example, about
whether a child’s injuries are consistent with a parent’s
testimony that the child was injured while playing or whether
the injuries are consistent with blunt force trauma inflicted by
the parent. Determinations regarding the external forces that
may have caused the child’s condition exceed the scope of a
diagnostic determination, however, and therefore the court
must separately ascertain that the medical expert has

187.
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN
Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 6, 2018).
188.
Id.

AND THE LAW

§ 3.20 (AM. LAW INST.,
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appropriate expertise to render an opinion on such issues and
that the opinion is adequately grounded in science.189
Recently, a Michigan appellate court recognized this limitation in
an SBS/AHT case. The court held:
Notwithstanding the propriety of a diagnosis of inflicted
trauma, we conclude that in cases involving allegations of
abuse, an expert goes too far when he or she diagnoses the
injury as “abusive head trauma“ or opines that the inflicted
trauma amounted to child abuse. The ordinary understanding
of the term “abuse”—as opposed to neglect or carelessness—
implies a level of willfulness and moral culpability that
implicates the defendant’s intent or knowledge when
performing the act that caused the head trauma. An expert
may not offer an opinion on the intent or criminal
responsibility of the accused.190
Current practice among child-abuse physicians routinely runs afoul
of this limitation, as does the SPR’s attempt to claim diagnosing abuse
as a purely medical determination.
The error can be understood by considering other forensic
disciplines that have run into trouble because analysts have testified to
statistical probabilities that lack a scientific foundation, or worse, to
near or even absolute certainty about the match of crime scene evidence
to a suspect—often in the guise of offering conclusions “to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty.” In its 2009 report on forensic sciences,
189.

Id. The Reporter’s Comment elaborates:

In both criminal and civil child-protection proceedings, courts often allow
medical experts to testify to their conclusion that physical abuse has
occurred. See, e.g., People v. Weeks, 369 P.3d 699 (Col. App. 2015) (a
medical expert may express a medical opinion that the child’s injuries were
caused by intentional child abuse “so long as (1) he or she does not give an
opinion on whether or not the defendant inflicted the injuries or whether the
injuries fit the legal definition of child abuse and (2) the jury is properly
instructed that it may accept or reject the opinion.”). This Section adopts a
more constrained role for medical expert testimony, limiting it to the child’s
diagnoses, the effects of the diagnoses for the child, and, where reliable, the
medical expert’s opinion of the external forces believed responsible for the
child’s diagnoses. The conclusion that the child’s diagnoses were the result
of abuse is a decision that should be left solely to the trier of fact.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
People v. McFarlane, 926 N.W.2d 339, 350 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
190.
Despite this holding, the court in McFarlane also suggested that physicians may opine
that a child’s injuries were “inflicted.” Id. This part of the decision makes little sense,
however, because calling an injury “inflicted” is effectively equivalent to calling it
“abusive.”
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the National Academy of Sciences identified such scientifically baseless
claims—claiming certainty or high statistical likelihoods when there was
no basis for either—as a serious problem with forensic expertise in the
courtroom.191
As a stark example of this type of error, in 2015, the FBI, working
in collaboration with the Innocence Project and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, examined the testimony of
its microscopic hair examiners in 268 cases from several decades prior
to 2000, finding that the analysts had testified in scientifically erroneous
or unsupportable ways in ninety-five percent of those cases.192 The
problem? Primarily, the analysts tended to make statistical or certainty
claims that had no scientific basis, such as claiming that they had
examined 10,000 hairs and had never found one like the one at issue, or
even giving specific astronomical odds of error, when no research
supported those statistics.193
Yet in child abuse cases, that is precisely the type of unscientific
certainty or odds claim that physicians make routinely—and that the
SPR so vehemently defends as a matter of medical diagnosis. But there
simply is no basis for “diagnosing” abuse to the exclusion of all other
causes of a child’s condition based on brain and eye findings, with or
without other medical findings. Dr. Kent Hymel and a team of leading
AHT/SBS proponents have acknowledged that “[g]old standard
definitional criteria for AHT do not exist.”194 They add that “in the
absence of a gold standard, clinicians can rarely confirm or exclude
AHT with complete certainty and are compelled instead to adopt a
probabilistic approach to the diagnosis.”195 All knowledgeable child
abuse physicians today agree that there is no established diagnostic
standard, and that the diagnosis is made upon the basis of a variety of
findings, each of which may or may not be present in any given case.196
In the end, they contend, it comes down to clinical judgment.197 It
191.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 47, 184, 186 (2009).
192.
Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades,
WASH. POST (April 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbioverstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-fordecades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510962fcfabc310_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.47a948574cd9.
193.
Spencer S. Hsu, Convicted Defendants Left Uninformed of Forensic
Flaws Found by
Justice
Dept., WASH. POST
(April 16, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/convicted-defendants-left-uninformed-offorensic-flaws-found-by-justice-dept/2012/04/16/gIQAWTcgMT_story.html.
194.
Kent P. Hymel et al., Derivation of a Clinical Prediction Rule for
Pediatric Abusive Head Trauma, 14 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 210, 212 (2013).
195.
Id. at 217.
See id. at 212.
196.
197.
See, e.g., Narang, supra note 49, at 529.
THE
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should be apparent, however, that any exercise of clinical judgment is
susceptible to error, even in contexts where there are clear and welldefined diagnostic criteria (indeed medical misdiagnosis is a serious
problem in all areas of medicine).198 But the typical testimony offered
by a child abuse physician is to assert a diagnosis “to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty,” without acknowledging any likelihood of
an alternative or any probability of misdiagnosis. Child abuse
physicians routinely claim that all other possibilities have been ruled
out, or that nothing else but shaking or shaking with impact could have
caused the child’s condition, or that a short fall could not have caused
the injuries, or that a lucid interval was not possible, or the like.199 The
SPR takes this all a step further, contending that such claims are noncontroversial, and that defense critics who point out the uncertainties
and the alternative possibilities have no place in the legal proceedings in
which abuse is alleged.200
Indeed, one of the nation’s most visible and outspoken SBS/AHT
prosecutors, Brian Holmgren, has urged that in SBS/AHT cases the
ethical expert should claim definiteness even when the medical evidence
in the expert’s opinion merely makes abuse very likely.201 Holmgren
acknowledges, for example, that accidental short falls can sometimes—
albeit rarely—produce the same constellation of signs and injuries (or
death) that are used to diagnose SBS/AHT. Nonetheless, he argues that,
198.
Medical experts recognize that, across all types of medical diagnoses,
“[c]ases of delayed, missed, and incorrect diagnoses are common, with an incidence in
the range of [ten to twenty percent],” and error is higher in clinical diagnoses and
lower with respect to diagnostic tests. Mark L. Graber et al., Bringing Diagnosis into
the Quality and Safety Equations, 308 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1211, 1211 (2012); “[I]t is
clear that an extensive and ever-growing literature confirms that diagnostic errors exist
at nontrivial and sometimes alarming rates. These studies span every specialty and
virtually every dimension of both inpatient and outpatient care.” Eta S. Berner & Mark
L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J.
MED. S2, S6 (2008).
Moreover, these errors are not just failures to recognize and diagnose diseases or
conditions; the errors are often those of over-diagnosis. In another pediatric realm, for
example, pediatricians misdiagnose ear infections an average of fifty percent of the
time, and most of the errors are of over-diagnosis (Type 1 errors) and over-prescription
of antibiotics. Michael E. Pichichero & Michael D. Poole, Assessing Diagnostic
Accuracy and Tympanocentesis Skills in the Management of Otitis Media, 155
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 1137, 1137, 1139 (2001); Richard M.
Rosenfeld, Diagnostic Certainty for Acute Otitis Media, 64 INT’L J. PEDIATRIC
OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 89, 89 (2002); Michael E. Pichichero & Michael D. Poole,
Comparison of Performance by Otolaryngologists, Pediatricians, and General
Practitioners on an Otoendoscopic Diagnostic Video Examination, 69 INT’L J.
PEDIATRIC OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 361, 361, 365 (2005).
199.
Findley et al., supra note 3, at 214.
200.
Choudhary et al., supra note 10, at 1049.
201.
Brian K. Holmgren, Ethical Issues in Forensic Testimony Involving
Abusive Head Trauma, 3 ACAD. FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 317, 319 (2013).
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“if the question [to the expert] is phrased ‘to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, [did] a short fall . . . cause the death of this child?’ .
. . then the correct answer should be ‘no’ given the extreme
unlikelihood of such an event.”202
But of course, the answer should not be “no.” The answer should
be, “I cannot say with certainty based upon the medical evidence
available to me. Short falls can cause such medical signs and injuries
(or death), but it is rare. Nothing in the medical research or my
findings in this case permits me to say that this case is not one of those
rare ones.” And if a caregiver or witness provides a history of a short
fall, the answer should be, “Nothing in the medical research or my
findings in this case permits me to say that this history is false, or that
this short fall could not be the cause of this child’s condition,” or “the
medical evidence in this case is consistent with the fall described by the
caregiver.” As the American Medical Association has cautioned, “it is
ethically important for a physician expert witness to make clear . . .
that probabilities not be misrepresented as definitive conclusions.”203
The SPR, like Holmgren, seeks to claim an authoritativeness and
certainty that the science does not permit, at least not in a legal context.
2. ADMISSIBILITY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE
“DIAGNOSIS”
All of this means, of course, that not everything the SPR seems to
claim to be within the expertise of the “diagnosing” physician is
admissible under the Rules of Evidence. Whether a jurisdiction follows
Frye’s “general acceptance” standard or Daubert’s “reliable science”
standard, limitations, not recognized by the SPR, will apply.
First, because claims of definitiveness or specific odds-based
claims are scientifically unsupportable, under Daubert they exceed the
scope of permissible testimony. Likewise, under Frye, because all
knowledgeable physicians recognize that “diagnosing” abuse involves
clinical judgment, and is not testable by any definitive test, any claim to
definitiveness of the “diagnosis” cannot be said to achieve “general
acceptance” in the medical community.
Certainly, physicians can identify observed medical conditions,
such as subdural or subarachnoid hematomas, retinal hemorrhages,
cerebral edema, fractures, or the like. And as the ALI observes, if
there is a reliable basis in the research physicians may testify about
whether, in the physician’s opinion, such findings are consistent with
various possibilities presented, including “whether the injuries are
202.
Id. (emphasis in original).
203.
Michael S. Goldrich, American Medical Association, Report of the
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA Report 12 - A-04), at 3 (2004).
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consistent with blunt force trauma inflicted by the parent.”204 But the
physician may not rule out innocent causes simply because they are
rare, or because the mechanism of injury is not well understood. And
the physician may not opine about what particular actions a third-party
took to cause those injuries, or whether any trauma was inflicted
knowingly or intentionally rather than accidentally. In other words, the
physician may not “diagnose” abuse in the courtroom.
To be sure, to date most courts, without a lot of thought or
analysis, have admitted SBS/AHT expert testimony (for both sides)
without limitation (in this regard, the courts have not improved on their
utter failure to regulate adequately the admissibility of almost all other
unscientific and unreliable forensic evidence in criminal cases).205 But
the medical research challenging many aspects of the SBS/AHT
hypothesis is growing, the ALI statement is new, and defense lawyers
and courts are just now beginning to become sophisticated enough in
this complicated area of medicine and law to understand the appropriate
limitations that should apply. The opportunities for getting it right are,
in short, growing.
A very recent decision from a court in Florida further illustrates
one way that a more thoughtful admissibility inquiry might play out. In
State v. Kent Johnson,206 after an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of the state’s experts’ SBS/AHT testimony, the court
excluded those parts of the experts’ proposed testimony that would have
gone beyond medical diagnosis of the child’s medical conditions and
wandered into much less well-grounded medical hypotheses that intrude
on legal judgments.207 The court ruled:
The Court finds that the term “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and
related terms set forth above [including also “shaking,”

204.
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 3.20 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2018).
205.
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal
Proceedings: Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125
(2003); Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and
Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left
on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 143–49 (2000); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The
Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 342 (2002); Randolph N. Jonakait,
The Meaning of Daubert and What That Means for Forensic Science, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2103, 2117 (1994).
206.
Order Granting Defendant’s Amended Motion In Limine to Exclude Any
Testimony Regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome or in the Alternative Request for a Frye
Hearing, State v. Johnson, Case No. 15-CF-018630-A, (Fla. Hillsborough Ct., Oct.
17, 2018).
207.
Id. at 1–2.
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“shaken baby,” “rotation acceleration,” or “accelerationdeceleration force”] to be supported by insufficient scientific
data and evidence. The Court finds that after reviewing the
motion, argument, and testimony from various witnesses,
there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the terminology
does not adequately describe the range of potential causes of
head injuries. There is no established science to support
“Shaken Baby Syndrome” as a valid diagnosis. Thus,
Defendant’s motion is granted and the Court limits the use of
the phrase “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and related phrases
stated in this Order from being used in the course of
Defendant’s trial.208
It is too early yet to know if this decision will be appealed and, if
so, whether it will stand up on appeal, or whether it will be followed by
other courts. But it does at least reflect growing recognition of the legal
problems with expert testimony in this field.
Regardless, even if broadly framed admissibility challenges like
this prove unavailing in other cases, at the very least some aspects of
the traditional SBS/AHT dogma are now so thoroughly undermined that
testimonial assertions related to them should not survive Daubert or
Frye challenges. Those include assertions that at one time were
ubiquitous, but now have been shown to be scientifically wrong or void
of any scientific foundation, including assertions such as (but not
limited to):
• Short falls cannot kill or cause serious brain injury
(including the triad and related findings);
• The forces required to cause such injuries would have to
be so massive as to be recognizable to any observer as
likely to kill or seriously harm the child, equivalent to the
forces in a high-speed automobile crash or a multi-story
fall;
• Nothing could cause the various medical findings relied
upon to “diagnose” abuse except shaking, shaking with
impact, or inflicted blunt force trauma;
• Lucid intervals between the time of injury and collapse are
not possible in cases involving serious brain injury.

208.
Id. See also Clark v. State, No. 2017-KA-00411-COA, 2019 WL
5566234, ¶¶ 47–48 (detailing how a Mississippi appellate court decision issued just as
this article was going to press holding that testimony “diagnosing” SBS was unreliable
and “should therefore have been excluded,” because “[t]here was no proof that the
medical science . . . reliably explained the biomechanical processes by which SBS or
AHT develop. . . . [and because t]here was . . . no proof that the medical science . . .
reliably aided the jury in understanding the cause and timing of [the child’s] death.”).
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B. Legal Implications of the Controversy
That the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” is controversial also has legal
implications. In part, the controversy adds to the admissibility questions
under Daubert or Frye discussed above. To the extent that both
Daubert and Frye turn at least in part on “general acceptance,” the fact
that so many propositions involved in diagnosing SBS/AHT in any
given case are controversial means that the controversies raise doubts
about admissibility.
The controversy also has legal implications for the duties of
defense counsel in representing individuals accused of child abuse.
Because so many of the propositions underlying the SBS/AHT
“diagnosis” in any given case are scientifically debatable, courts are
increasingly recognizing that defense counsel fail to meet Sixth
Amendment standards for effective assistance of counsel if they fail to
obtain expert assistance from appropriate medical and/or other
scientific experts, including from those who are critical of the
hypothesis.209
Similarly, the disputes impose obligations on trial courts to ensure
that indigent defendants have the funds necessary to hire appropriate
209.
See, e.g., West Virginia Innocence Project Client Freed from Prison,
WVUTODAY (Aug. 16, 2018), https://wvutoday.wvu.edu/stories/2018/08/16/westvirginia-innocence-project-client-freed-from-prison
[https://perma.cc/TU8J-USUW];
Order Granting Post-Conviction Relief, Reversing Petitioner’s Judgment and Sentence,
and Remanding to the District Court of Wagoner County for a New Trial, Brafford v.
State, No. PC-2014-803 (Okla. Crim. App., Mar. 26, 2019) (on file with author);
Maurice Possley, Krystal Voss, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Sept. 20, 2017),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5198
[https://perma.cc/5SEA-BQ37]; Commonwealth v. Millien, 50 N.E.3d 808, 814, 816–
18 (Mass. 2016); Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 N.E.3d 1247, 1255, 1258, 1263 (Mass.
2016); People v. DiMambro, 897 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016); People v.
Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Mich. 2015); State v. Pheils, No. WD-14-072, 2015
WL 5306548 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Sissoko v. State, 182 A.3d 874, 876 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2018) (noting that initial conviction was overturned based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, and then affirming conviction after retrial); Memorandum,
Statement of Reasons, and Order Regarding Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
Dobson v. State, No. 20-K-09-9572 (Cir. Ct. Kent Cty., Apr. 7, 2014); Adam Armour,
Judge Vacates Convicted Murderer’s Guilty Plea, ITAWAMBA CTY. TIMES (July 2,
2014),
https://www.djournal.com/itawamba/news/itawamba-county/judge-vacatesconvicted-murderer-s-guilty-plea/article_dea69b1f-bbd7-5d73-bd14-236634add1d7.html
[https://perma.cc/Z48S-WPT6]; Joseph Shapiro, Judge Tosses Conviction of Texas Man
Accused of Sexually Assaulting Infant, NPR (Jan. 26, 2012, 11:29 AM),
https://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/01/26/145901310/judge-tosses-convictionof-texas-man-accused-of-sexually-assaulting-infant
[https://perma.cc/D8RN-DMD2];
Armando
Castillo,
AZ
JUST.
PROJECT
(May
21,
2015),
https://www.azjusticeproject.org/manifest-injustice-profiles/armando-castillo
[https://perma.cc/45EG-3223]; State v. Schoonmaker, 176 P.3d 1105, 1116 (N.M.
2008); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007); Ex Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 ,
469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
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experts to assist them in these medical-science-dependent prosecutions.
In this regard, courts are also recognizing that failure to appoint the
necessary defense experts in these cases violates due process under the
principles enunciated in Ake v. Oklahoma.210
Finally, the controversy has implications for courts assessing postconviction challenges to prior SBS/AHT convictions based on claims of
newly discovered evidence. As noted above, when a conviction is
obtained on the basis of uncontroverted medical opinion evidence
presenting SBS/AHT as settled science with no alternatives, the new
research raising the various challenges that create the serious
controversies today can be and is increasingly being used as the basis
for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.211 As
numerous courts have now recognized, when a case is presented as
based on settled science, and especially when that settled science
constitutes the bulk of the prosecution’s case, new evidence that the
science is not so certain requires a new trial at which a jury can fully
consider the competing claims.212
CONCLUSION
In its “consensus statement,” the SPR tries to wave away the
roiling controversy about the reliability of SBS/AHT “diagnoses” by
declaring that there is, in fact, no genuine controversy and that, in any
event, the question is purely one of medical diagnostics for which
courts should defer to medical judgments. We have shown that SPR is
wrong on both counts. There are very serious questions about the
reliability of SBS/AHT “diagnoses,” and those questions cannot be
papered over by bringing together a guild of true believers to publish a
“consensus statement.” And the SBS/AHT “diagnosis” is inherently a
legal judgment for which the courts must continue to play a gatekeeping
role.

210.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). For examples of cases
reversing SBS/AHT convictions based on Ake violations, see Isham v. State, 161 So.3d
1076 (Miss. 2015); Brown v. State, 152 So. 3d 1146, 1170 (Miss. 2014); State v.
Gallaway, 2015 WL 4460992 (Del. 2015); McDonald v. State, 101 So.3d 914, 916
(Fla. App. 2012).
211.
See cases cited supra note 209.
For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Findley & Risinger, supra note
212.
64, at 1224–25.
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APPENDIX 1
October 27, 2017
Via Email and Regular U.S. Mail
Society for Pediatric Radiology
1891 Preston White Drive
Reston, VA 20191
Re: “Consensus Statement on Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and
Young Children”
We are longstanding SPR members who have published, lectured
and consulted on shaken baby syndrome/abusive head trauma
(SBS/AHT) and related subjects. On October 17 we received via email
a lengthy (50 page, 211 reference) paper titled Consensus Statement on
Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children whose stated
purpose is to provide guidance to the courts, the media and the public.
While the SPR’s Child Abuse Imaging Committee led the effort to
prepare the Statement, the authors include several child abuse
pediatricians and a law professor who are leading advocates of the
SBS/AHT hypothesis. The email invites comments, but imposed a
deadline of October 27. This was the first we had heard about any of
this.
Because of the short timeframe for comment, which is limited to
SPR members, our feedback is abbreviated. We provide these
preliminary comments to meet the October 27 deadline, but ask for an
opportunity to submit a more complete response. Should the SPR
publish the Consensus Statement, we ask that the response be published
with the Statement or shortly thereafter. We also recommend that
comments be invited from other interested parties.
Our concern is that as presently written, the Statement is likely to
be misleading to the courts and others on the nature and extent of the
SBS/AHT controversy. SBS/AHT refers to the hypothesis that shaking
or abuse may be reliably inferred from various internal radiological or
pathological findings, none of which are specific to trauma. The
Consensus Statement characterizes the literature supporting the
SBS/AHT hypothesis as based on medical science and the literature
questioning the reliability of the inference or suggesting alternative
causes as grounded in denialism of child abuse and a desire to improve
defense outcomes for abusive caretakers. This is incorrect. We are
familiar with the medical, scientific and legal literature that raises
concerns about the quality of evidence supporting SBS/AHT beliefs and
there is no denialism of child abuse within that literature. There is,
however, considerable and growing concern about the reliability of the
diagnostic criteria and an increasing interest in the differential diagnosis
for the findings on which the diagnosis is based.
The Controversy
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The Consensus Statement suggests that there is no legitimate
controversy on SBS/AHT. In recent years many courts have
acknowledged the existence of a legitimate controversy on this subject.
The controversy also exists within the medical, scientific and legal
literature. In 2016, a report from the President’s Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology on the scientific flaws in numerous areas of
forensic science stated that SBS/AHT was a subject beyond the scope of
the report, but is a matter that requires “urgent attention.” In October
2016, a Swedish governmental agency published the results of a two
year review of the evidence base for SBS that concluded that the
traditional diagnostic criteria for SBS were unreliable and based on low
or very low quality evidence, with the only support coming from two
confession articles. Views that the Consensus Statement holds out as
matters of general acceptance are also widely questioned in the fields of
forensic pathology and biomechanics.
The Diagnostic Criteria
The Consensus Statement states that SBS/AHT is a “medical
diagnosis” but does not mention that the diagnostic criteria have
changed substantially over the past decades. Instead, the Statement
seeks to inform judges, jurors, the media, and the public that the
critiques
of
SBS/AHT
proceed
from
the
“deliberate
mischaracterization” that SBS/AHT is diagnosed based on a “triad” of
findings rather than a multidisciplinary medical and nonmedical
investigation. However, the triad findings (subdural hemorrhage,
retinal hemorrhage and cerebral edema and/or encephalopathy) have
had and continue to have enormous significance in diagnosing
SBS/AHT. The child abuse literature is filled with references to the
triad, or merely the presence of subdural and retinal hemorrhage in the
absence of a history of major trauma, as being virtually diagnostic of
SBS/AHT. It is therefore critical to evaluate the diagnostic value of
these elements, individually and in combination, as well as to
understand the range of alternative traumatic and non-traumatic
conditions that result in these findings. When one does so, major
concerns emerge.
3. The Pathological Assumptions
The SBS hypothesis stemmed from assumptions that the cerebral
edema, subdural hemorrhage, and retinal hemorrhages found
in children without external evidence of significant head trauma
reflected traumatic diffuse axonal injury, ruptured bridging
veins, and vitreoretinal hemorrhage, and that in nearly all
instances repetitive violent shaking best explained these “shearing
injuries.” We now know,
however,
that
the
cerebral
edema
typically
reflects
hypoxicischemic injury rather than
DAI; that the scant or thin subdural hemorrhage common in these
cases may reflect oozing from within the dura rather than torn
bridging veins; and that retinal hemorrhages occur
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in a wide range of traumatic and non-traumatic conditions. There is as
yet no evidence to validate vitreoretinal traction as the source of retinal
findings in children. Accordingly, viewing these findings as indicative
of shaking is an increasingly dubious hypothesis. Any Consensus
Statement should acknowledge the overlap in findings between
accidental injuries, abusive injuries and natural causes.
4. Short Falls
A common history in children presenting with subdural
hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and/or seizures or other neurologic
defect is that the children sustained a short fall or similar accidental
trauma. For years the prevailing guidance in the child abuse literature
was that this history was necessarily false. The current evidence, which
includes at least two videotaped and many witnessed short falls, now
provides indisputable evidence that short falls in young children may
cause all of these findings and, occasionally, death. Several court
decisions have recognized the evolving understandings in this area. The
prevailing view in forensic pathology is that a history of a short fall in
the presence of an isolated impact injury cannot be rejected as a
potential explanation for subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage,
brain injury or even death.
5. The Quality of the SBS/AHT Evidence Base
The reliability of SBS/AHT diagnoses depends on the quality of
the evidence that has historically reported strong associations between
the triad findings and SBS/AHT. It is now recognized that the
SBS/AHT literature is based largely on studies that used circular and
self-fulfilling methodology—e.g., subdural and retinal hemorrhages
were used as primary diagnostic and classification criteria for
SBS/AHT in studies that then reported an extremely high rate of such
hemorrhages in SBS/AHT. This circular reasoning has been noted in
meta-analyses, and a leading 2011 child abuse textbook further
concluded that confessions were the evidence base for SBS. The recent
Swedish Report similarly found that nearly the entire SBS evidence
base is circular and unreliable. The two papers it classified as moderate
quality were confession papers. The Consensus Statement ignores these
evidentiary concerns and dismisses the Swedish Report in a few
sentences, citing comments accusing its authors of unethical bias and of
unreasonableness in refusing to accept the findings of child protection
teams as sufficiently reliable for study classification purposes. The
Statement does not refer to an additional paper published by the authors
of the Swedish Report titled Is Accepting Circular Reasoning in Shaken
Baby Studies Bad Science or Misconduct?, in which the authors
explained that using “the classification used by child protection teams
as the gold standard for classifying study cases and controls entails a
high risk of bias and carries a risk that false positive cases are presented
as true-positive cases.” The citation of responses to the Report,
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including by one of the Statement’s authors, while omitting replies from
the Report’s authors is inappropriate for a “Consensus Statement.”
6. Natural Causes
As faith in the diagnostic specificity of the triad has waned,
attention has turned to alternative explanations for the findings
previously viewed as diagnostic or even pathognomonic of shaking.
Many controversies and unknowns exist concerning the diagnostic
criteria for alternative diagnoses; many of them are rare, have been
incompletely studied, and/or have been underdiagnosed because of
mistaken beliefs that the triad findings reflected SBS/AHT. The
guidance offered by the Consensus Statement on a handful of natural
causes that produce similar findings is misleading. We offer immediate
feedback about the Statement’s criticisms of two of these diagnoses.
Cerebral Venous Thrombosis (CVT). The Consensus Statement
asserts that CVT is not associated with subdural hemorrhage and,
further, that findings attributed to CVT actually reflect intracranial
venous injury caused by abuse. Outside the child abuse literature there
is existing and growing awareness that CVT often produces intracranial
hemorrhage, that it is rarely associated with trauma, and that it may be
difficult on imaging to distinguish between thrombosed veins and extraaxial hemorrhage. While venous thrombosis may also occur in head
injury, there is a general understanding that CVT has been underdiagnosed in the pediatric population and reason to believe that it has
been misdiagnosed as SBS/AHT in the courtroom.
BESS. Benign enlargement (or expansion) of the subarachnoid
spaces (“BESS”) is a diagnosis known by several names. The
Consensus Statement advises that BESS was “initially thought to
predispose to SDH with minimal trauma,” but that recent reviews
reveal that less than 6% of such patients develop subdural collections.
The Statement urges caution about studies indicating a higher
prevalence because they may have lacked adequate assessment for
abuse. This guidance is not, however, a consensus position. A 2011
review summarized: “Several studies have shown an increased risk of
subdural hematomas in children with external hydrocephalus after
minimal or no known head trauma.” The recent studies the Statement
claims are more reliable should be examined to ensure that this is not a
function of selection bias or circularity—e.g., the exclusion of cases
diagnosed as SBS/AHT on the basis of the child having subdural or
retinal hemorrhage, seizures, or a history of minor trauma.
***
As a matter of scientific vigor, continuing review of the strength of
the evidence base for the SBS/AHT diagnosis is mandatory. In less than
two decades we have seen a shift from dogmatic medical claims that the
triad is diagnostic or even pathognomonic of shaking to the claim set
forth in the proposed Consensus Statement that the triad is a “legal
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argument and not a medically valid term.” As the discussion continues,
we must remember that these are not abstract concepts but rather are
diagnoses that are used to remove children from their homes and to
imprison their parents and caretakers. In this context, attempting to
demean or mischaracterize countering viewpoints reflects advocacy, not
science. Should the SPR still intend to issue the Consensus Statement,
we ask for the opportunity to publish a fuller response. We believe such
a response can be completed within 30 days.
Sincerely,
Patrick D. Barnes, M.D.
Julie A. Mack, M.D.

